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In 150 years, the trends in regional disparities in economic development within Italy have differed 
depending on whether they are gauged by longitude or by latitude. The disparities between western 
and eastern regions first widened and then closed; the North-South gap, by contrast, remains the main 
open problem in the national history of Italy. 
This work focuses on the underlying causes of the turning points in regional disparities since national 
unification in 1861. The first came in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with the 
industrialization of the so-called “industrial triangle”. This was followed by the “failed new turn” 
during the interwar years: not only were the beginnings of convergence blocked but the North-South 
gap, until then still natural, inevitable, was transformed into a fracture of exceptional dimensions. 
The second turning point, in the twenty years after the World War, produced the first substantial, 
lasting convergence between southern and northern Italy, powered by rising productivity and 
structural change in the South. The last turning point was in the mid-1970s, when convergence was 
abruptly halted and a protracted period of immobility in the disparity began. 
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2 
Like other countries, Italy has been marked in its economic development by 
pronounced geographical disparities and fluctuating processes of stability and change in 
those disparities. The clearest aspect is the persistent backwardness of the regions making up 
the South. This highly visible feature, exceptional in the international framework, has often 
overshadowed other developments in the evolution in the history of economic geography. 
For instance, the extraordinary convergence of another, equally large number of regions 
towards the levels of income and output of the most affluent part of the country. Or the 
strong tensions, within the persistent “Southern question,” between the forces of 
convergence and divergence, such as to alter, over time, its causes and features. The history 
of geographical disparities is not one of immobility but of change; not a single cause but 
multiple determinants. Nothing could be more mistaken than to imagine that the great 
durability of the Southern question means that, in the history of Italian regional 
development, nothing has ever changed. 
The stylized history we present is that of the differences in levels and trends in 
economic growth between the regions and between the two great divisions, North and South. 
The summary indicator used will be per capita output, flanked by indicators of “human 
development,” especially education and health. In recent years the study of this history has 
been greatly enriched by the availability of appreciably more and better quantitative data 
than in the past: time series on regional GDP, sectoral productivity, industrial value added 
(with detailed sectoral and territorial disaggregations), the local components of public 
spending, the geographical distribution of educational levels, health, poverty.
3 We employ 
these new resources to focus on the decisive moments in Italian regional and economic 
history, describing the various initial conditions and identifying the turning points of the 
convergence process. 
This work is part of the Bank of Italy’s research project of historical analysis of Italy’s 
evolving international position. As the linkage between the Italian and world economies has 
consisted, and still does, in the inflows and outflows of goods, the history of Italian regional 
disparities translated largely into the history of the various regions’ ability to adapt to the 
changes in international demand. Accordingly, a central part of our work is given over to the 
industrial side of the regional economies. 
Our stylized history divides the 150 years since national unification into four great 
periods. The first, from unification to the mid-1880s, was a time of relatively equal output 
levels and similar growth rates, despite differing economic environments. The second, from 
then to the 1950s, was the period of better performance in the regions of the North-West, 
later involving also the North-East and the Centre, and the consequent creation – over this 
protracted period of seven decades – of an enormous gap in per capita GDP between the 
South and the rest of the country. The third period, from the 1950s until the oil crisis of the 
1970s, was one of substantial convergence among all regions, and in particular the advance 
                                                 
2 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions 
represented. 
3 Nor must we neglect to mention Istat’s invaluable “Digital library” project, which has already made available 
an enormous quantity of statistics produced since Italian unity, including the first national censuses (which we 
use here to identify the country’s nascent industrial clusters). 
 
5of the South towards the income levels of the rest of Italy. The fourth and final period, since 
the oil crisis, has seen variegated trends, not such as to either attenuate or exacerbate the 
overall inequality. We have thus identified three major turning points in which trends in 
convergence or divergence change pace or direction. The purpose of this work is to set out 
the causes of these outcomes in each period. 
From a broader, European perspective, Italian macro-areas and regions at unification, 
and for the first two decades thereafter, were uniformly poorer, all basically still agricultural 
economies, but with different degrees of backwardness in terms of the size of industry, 
infrastructure, living conditions, human capital. In greater detail, at provincial or sub-
provincial level, internal disparities are sometimes quite substantial, even between adjacent 
territories, often mirroring the distances between the districts around the old capital cities 
and the rest of their regions. The advantage of some cities in the North-West in human 
development indicators and in the extent of highly specialized industries in many 
administrative districts was already perfectly clear. There, more than elsewhere, we find 
particularly favourable environmental, economic and social conditions for industrialization. 
There was a large internal market in the Po valley, made possible by topography; dense 
networks of roads, navigable waterways, the first railways; numerous, interconnected urban 
centres; and available waterpower. Modernization processes were under way, notably 
irrigated farming; craft and industrial production was found in many centres; industrial, 
specialized clusters were present; other European countries were nearby and contact with 
them was easy; precisely for this reason modern banking structures arose in these areas, 
accompanying and sustaining the growth of manufacturing. The level of schooling was 
decidedly higher than in the other regions of Italy, and educational institutions were being 
established, from technical schools to the polytechnical university. 
Thus the seeds for a widening of the development gap were present from the start. The 
fruit came with the first turning point, the decades around the turn of the century, when 
industrialization was concentrated – as is common in economic history – in a few areas. In 
Italy, this was the “industrial triangle” of Milan, Turin and Genoa and bordering zones. Not 
only did these areas record rapid development of the textile industry but also, and above all, 
the rise of more modern industries, first of all engineering but also steel and chemicals. 
Government policy fostered rather than fought the emergence of these disparities. As 
in other European countries at the time, social and education spending was minimal. Social 
solidarity and health care were in the hands of private bodies or mutual societies, which for 
historical reasons were more common in the North. Education was charged to municipal 
budgets, and its expansion was affected by differences in fiscal capacity. It was no accident 
that the regional literacy gap did not narrow but widened. Trade policy – with the turn to 
protectionism in the late 1880s – openly sustained the nascent industries and grain farming, 
penalizing precisely the more modern and highly developed part of southern agriculture. 
Like other nations, the young Italian state paid the greatest possible attention to defence. 
This entailed not only heavy current spending (naturally greater in the North, along the 
country’s borders) but also major support for Italian industry. There has been considerable, 
illuminating discussion of the geographical effects both of fiscal unification and of the 
impact of taxation and spending. The most important public programme of the day, the 
building of an extensive rail network, does not appear to have had any significant impact on 
the more distant regions’ access to interregional markets.  
 
6Nevertheless, up to the eve of the First World War the country’s surprising progress in 
every economic and social variable involves the entire territory, albeit with varying intensity. 
Life expectancy at birth, for centuries stuck at exceptionally low levels, increased by more 
than 16 years on average and by 6 years even in the region with the worst performance. The 
growth of industry, though concentrated in the North-West, involved all parts of the country. 
At the end of this first period of our history, the South did not trail the Centre or the North-
East by an appreciable margin in the size of its industry and its endowment of “points of 
excellence”. As late as the mid-1920s, the scale of regional development disparities was not 
particularly unusual by European standards, and in developments in the sphere of policy one 
can see an awareness of the question of southern industrialization and the premises for 
policy action.  
But history took a different direction, with a sort of “failed new turn” for the South. 
Research in regional economic history has yet to investigate this period as deeply as the 
decades preceding and following it, but the information we do have suggests that a series of 
events, running from the preparations for entry into the First World War to reconstruction 
after the Second World War, not only blocked the seeds of convergence, but transformed the 
North-South disparity, still “normal” until then, into a gap that would be exceedingly hard to 
close. 
The per capita output gap between the South and the rest of the country widened more 
rapidly during the Fascist years than during the initial era of Italian industrialization or, for 
that matter, any other historical period. Emigration abroad was blocked, and Fascist policies 
first discouraged and then banned any form of internal migration, which could have 
accompanied the differences in income and economic structure between regions. Available 
capital was concentrated in the industries already established in the North-West: first with 
the abnormal growth of war industry; then with the repeated rescue operations in the 1920s 
and policies that assisted the creation of cartels and the defence of incumbent firms from 
new competitors; finally, with the transfer to the State – with the birth of Institute for 
Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) in 1933 – of a major part of the Italian banking sector and 
manufacturing. The Second World War and post-war reconstruction in the late 1940s 
continued to act in the same direction. During the war the modest industrial apparatus of the 
South was hit much harder than that of the North. Then, the latter’s modernization absorbed 
the largest share of the international resources earmarked to relaunch the Italian economy. 
In 1951, while the Centre and North-East had already made up a (small) part of the gap 
accumulated up to 1911, the South’s starting conditions were worse, at least in relative 
terms, than they had been at the time of national unification. Those conditions were partly 
the result of the artificial containment of the dynamic of migration and that of the sectoral 
redistribution of output. Over the next twenty years the combined effect of those dynamics, 
finally free to act, and of the new economic policy approaches – in some respects 
reminiscent of those only undertaken in the “Age of Giolitti” after the turn of the century – 
would produce the first considerable, enduring convergence between North and South. The 
pronounced catching-up marks the second turning point of our history: the South of Italy 
was one of the regions of the world that enjoyed the fastest growth in output. 
The chief engine of this convergence was productivity. It grew both within sectors and 
in the economy as a whole as a result of the changing sectoral composition of economic 
activities. The modernization process was intense in both agriculture and industry, the latter 
 
7following with a lag of some ten years. However, trends in industry varied widely across the 
different types of firm. On the one hand, there was an increasing number of large, capital-
intensive plants in basic sectors serving the domestic market and necessary for products 
downstream. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these investments were made by 
companies based in the North-West or by state-owned corporations and determined by fiscal 
incentives, the modernization of southern infrastructure, and lower labour costs. The gain in 
North-South integration, fostered by the way the new manufacturing plants in the South 
served the country’s industrial needs, had beneficial effects for the whole Italian economy. 
At the same time, however, the endogenous fabric of manufacturing in the South 
shrank, a development that persisted and indeed gained pace in the following decades. These 
years saw the creation of a truly integrated national market, with a radical reduction in 
transport and transaction costs. Most small southern producers were forced out of this new 
market by the competition of firms from the Centre and North, which individual capacities, 
but also history and geography, had endowed with superior organization and 
competitiveness. Rising income and demand stoked an increase not so much in native 
production as in interregional imports. 
A set of public policy programmes accompanied these processes. There were specific 
southern development programmes, whose linchpin was the Southern Italy Development 
Fund, which for the first decade focused on the infrastructure endowment for agriculture, 
water supply and government services and from the 1960s on extended its action to direct 
industrial promotion. And there were national programmes that increased the role of 
government throughout the country: the welfare, health and education systems were 
strengthened. These policies were not expressly targeted at the weakest regions, but 
spending on them was proportionate to population, not output, so while their per capita 
effect was similar in North and South, their impact in relation to aggregate economic activity 
was greater in the South. The increase in per capita public spending, independently of per 
capita income, involved an implicit transfer of substantial resources to the population of the 
South in parallel to the flow of interregional imports of manufactured goods. 
These policy programmes entailed a structural rebalancing, albeit partial, in the face of 
markedly unequal endowments in such fields as educational and health infrastructure. The 
convergence of human development indicators was even faster than that in output indicators. 
For example, a century after unification the level of education, measured by years of school 
attendance, finally became similar in all the Italian regions. The national government, 
perhaps for the first time since unification, began to be felt as a positive presence in the 
South. 
But then, in the 1970s, came the third turning point of our story. The convergence 
process came to an abrupt halt, opening the path to a protracted period in which regional 
income and output gaps have remained more or less constant. Why did convergence stop? 
As in the preceding period, multiple factors were at work, but in the opposite direction: 
industry (and capital movements), migrations (and the movement of labour), and public 
policies. 
The industrialization of the South from the outside was interrupted. With the altered 
macroeconomic environment at national and international level, industrial investments went 
much more to modernizing and restructuring the existing industrial apparatus than to 
expanding it. And, for good measure, industry in the South, given its size, sectoral and 
 
8technological characteristics, was more exposed to adverse economic developments (rise in 
labour costs and the cost of energy, competition of newly industrialized countries) and less 
able to follow the new paths that Italian industry would take following the oil shock. 
New paths were made viable first of all by a prolonged, sharp depreciation of the 
currency (throughout the 1970s and then, after the lira crisis of 1992, up to 1996). The 
consequent rise in the propensity to export was not greater in the North than in the South, 
where, on the contrary, it was greater in the 1990s; rather, it was constantly greater in the 
eastern regions, along the Adriatic seaboard, than in the West. But the starting level was so 
dramatically different that exports had only a modest impact on the economy of the South. 
New paths taken, then, in reaction to sharply rising labour costs, with accentuated 
decentralization of production and significant competitiveness gains by smaller firms, 
especially those operating in industrial districts producing consumer goods. But these 
phenomena, too, were a good deal less intense in the South. The decentralization of 
production followed economic criteria of geographical contiguity and swept through the 
Centre and North-East, but the South partook of it to a far lesser extent. Convergence 
between the North-East and North-West was completed, and the Centre also made up 
ground. The North-South industrial division of labour, happily launched in the 1950s and 
1960s, waned steadily in importance. 
Finally, the competitiveness of southern industry was dealt a blow by the abolition in 
1968 of “wage cages”, which differentiated wages geographically. Employers were 
compensated by having a portion of their social security contributions bill charged to the 
state budget, a scheme that would absorb growing portions of the public resources 
earmarked and that was eliminated from 1995 onwards. Labour costs in the South moved 
into line with the national average, but in a context of significantly lower levels of 
productivity. 
These developments caused the industrial engine of convergence to stall. This does not 
mean that the industrial apparatus of the South became insignificant. Despite worse 
locational and infrastructural conditions than in the rest of Italy and in many European 
regions, it did contribute to preventing a return to regional divergence in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, it was unable to accelerate growth with respect to the rest of the country, 
and, like all of Italian industry, suffered from the acute problems of competitiveness that 
marked the first decade of this century. 
The role of demographic factors also diminished. With the crisis of the mid-1970s and 
the decline in labour demand in the Centre and North, domestic migration slowed abruptly. 
Up to the middle of the 1990s the South, which had always had higher natural population 
growth rates than the rest of Italy, experienced a sizable pick-up in the growth rate of its 
resident population, which significantly slowed the rate of increase in its GDP per capita. 
Over the twenty years these trends changed. The natural rate of population growth slowed 
until it was in line with the national average. Internal migration resumed in the mid-1990s, 
including a major component of young and skilled workers. Italy, once a country of 
emigration, became a destination for immigration, and the immigrants settled chiefly in the 
regions of the North. So in the first decade of this century the historical patterns were 
reversed: much faster population growth in the Centre and North (due to migration, not 
natural increase) determined broadly similar growth in per capita income in all the macro-
regions. 
 
9Lastly, the intensity and quality of public policy programmes declined. Southern 
development action, though formally extended, became less incisive, less concentrated, 
technically poorer and more subject to political influence, increasingly focused on ordinary 
investment that definitively eradicated its quality of additionality. The ending of special 
investment for the South in 1992 came after a long period of stagnation, which coincided 
with the fiscal adjustment effort of the mid-1990s that hit the South hard. In parallel with the 
strengthening of the European Community’s cohesion policies, among other things, in 1998 
a new policy for Southern development was launched. It sought to learn from the lessons of 
the past, but achieved generally modest results. 
Political priorities changed. With the enormous exodus from agriculture and the 
incomplete development of a modern, market-based industrial apparatus and, at the same 
time, the remarkable increase in per capita income and the population’s expectations, 
addressing the “Southern question” has come to mean not so much countering dire poverty 
as remedying a lack of jobs. In contrast with the pattern in many other countries, regional 
income differentials are determined not primarily by the productivity gap but by huge 
differences in employment rates. Especially up to 1992, many current public programmes 
sought to compensate for the lack of work and mitigate situations of social hardship. They 
proved ineffective, however, both because they were often designed for a particular 
exchange between politicians and final beneficiaries and owing to the simultaneous lack of 
structural measures to reduce the imbalance between labour demand and supply. 
There is a rich debate on the role of the public sector in the South, especially in the last 
thirty years. Many observers underscore the distortions of public action and hold it 
responsible for throttling growth. Recent studies by the Bank of Italy show that, while the 
intensity of public action has become relatively similar from region to region (excluding the 
major outlays on pensions, a good deal higher in the Centre and North), the quality of public 
services is significantly lower in the South. There is a lively discussion on the causes of 
these phenomena and the possible remedies. 
In any case, it is undeniable that the historical convergence of the quality-of-life 
indicators has sprung from the construction of the major health and education networks as 
well as from the growth in income. As noted, there is still a difference in the quality of these 
networks, and the gap is sometimes very considerable, but for some time now what is at 
issue in the “Southern question” has not been dire poverty, illiteracy or early death. Despite 
the continuing disparities between North and South in social exclusion indices, human 
capital and health (which, on the contrary, are taking on new, severe forms), then, this is a 
great success story. To be sure, it depends in part from the existence of national public 
services, whose upkeep implies redistributive transfers between territories. As is well 
known, this issue is at the heart of a harsh political debate. 
The poorer state of public safety and legality in the Southern regions remains an issue, 
not least in light of the growing and more virulent manifestations of organized crime. In 
some parts of the South these phenomena were already present at the time of national 
unification, in others they have spread in recent decades, in others still they are practically 
absent. 
It is difficult today to sketch the outlook for regional trends in Italy, considering the 
enormous complexity of the internationalization processes now at work, the events in the 
European Union, the possible alteration of national policies (including in light of the Italian 
 
10public debt) and the tendencies towards decentralization of certain functions. There may be 
acute risks of a fresh divergence. The opposite scenario would be desirable: one in which, as 
in the 1950s and 1960s, faster growth in production and income in the South not only gives 
rise to convergence but also supports the progressive development of the entire national 
economy. 
1.  When, where and why regional disparities arose in Italy: 1861-1913 
1.1  The starting conditions: differences in output and in the prerequisites for 
growth 
For almost twenty years after unification the regional dispersion of GDP in Italy was 
less than it would become in subsequent years and lower too than in other European 
countries at comparable levels of development (Table 1)
4. This comes as no surprise, 
considering that: 
- no region had experienced a real industrial take-off, and productivity did not differ 
greatly from region to region in agriculture, the largely predominant sector (Table 2)
5; 
-  economic relations between sectors and factor mobility, variables that could fuel 
agglomeration and concentration of production, started out from very modest levels
6 and 
were hindered by the backwardness of transport systems; 
- many regions contained important urban clusters, typically coinciding with capital 
cities or old commercial centres and their hinterlands. This is likely to have determined a 
greater variability of output within the economic macro-areas than between them. 
Consistently with the western location of the capitals of the pre-unification states (Fenoaltea, 
2007), in 1871 the geographical disparities were also longitudinal, with an East-West divide 
similar to the South-North gap (Figure 1). The presence of a multiplicity of former capitals 
probably can explain the fact that the regional disparities in Italy were also low by 
comparison with countries that had achieved political or economic unification earlier, where 
output was strongly concentrated in the old capital cities. In 1871 per capita income in the 
Lazio region, containing Rome, was only 5 per cent greater than the average for Liguria and 
Lombardy (the second- and third-richest regions), while the gap between London and East 
                                                 
4 The two reconstructions of the trends in GDP per capita from 1861 available for this work are: (1) that 
presented in Daniele and Malanima (2007) and Svimez (2011) in 1911 prices, at factor cost and current borders 
(which shows the data for years), (2) that presented in Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi (2011), at 2010 prices and 
the regional boundaries of time (which starts at the regional level since 1871, and reports the data at intervals 
usually twenty years before 1951, ten later). For methods of constructing the two series and the original sources 
used, please refer to the original articles. The differences between the gaps between areas calculated on the two 
series are relatively small, and are concentrated mainly in the initial period: in 1871 the gap is estimated at 
98.9% for Daniel and Malanima, to 84.5% for Brunetti et al.. In 1951 the gap is estimated at 47.3% for Daniel 
and Malanima, to 49.4% for Brunetti et al.. After 1951 the differences in differences are minimal. In the work 
we have chosen to use both sets, indicating that each time the series was used. 
5 Federico (2007) writes that “total factor productivity in the North was practically the same as in the South in 
1891”. Although he warns that his findings need to be treated with caution because the quality of the data 
available is still poor, they do tally with the results of a long series of studies that have cast doubt on the 
stereotype of backward southern agriculture at the time of unification.  
6 According to Vera Zamagni, at unification interstate trade accounted for only 20% of trade in the Italian states 
(Zamagni, 1993, p. 10). 
 
11Midlands, or between Madrid and Catalonia, or Paris and its hinterland, or Vienna and 
Salzburg, approached or exceeded 40 per cent (Table 1). 
The relative uniformity of per capita income did not mean, however, that the living 
conditions of the national population were similar across regions. Mean income is a 
notoriously imperfect measure of welfare, especially when income is highly concentrated in 
a small fraction of the population.
7 Furthermore, the economic activities that would produce 
the initial “take-off” still accounted for only a small share of output: the low dispersion of 
per capita GDP implied neither that the Italian regions all were equally endowed with 
identical growth potential, nor that the local starting conditions of industry, soon to become 
the driver of the country’s development, were similar. 
On the contrary, it is precisely a reading of these features that brings out the South’s 
backwardness at the time of unification, pointing to what later became the North-South 
divide in levels of economic development. Or, if you will, defining the order of magnitude 
(financial, but not only) of the policies the young nation would have needed to prevent that 
divide. 
Taken together, the statistical indicators that we will discuss – some of them 
reconstructed very recently – confirm the severe verdict on the southern economy’s potential 
expressed by Cavour’s missi dominici and nicely summed up by an historian such as 
Giuseppe Galasso when he spoke of the “ … uneven inadequacy of the country [the 
Kingdom of Naples] and of its industrialization to the needs of a modern economy”.
8 
In 1861, the diffusion of “well-being” was lower in the southern regions than in the 
country as a whole, and this holds both for the share of the population classified as poor, 
equal to 52 per cent in the South and 37 per cent in the Centre and North (Amendola, 
Brandolini and Vecchi, 2001) and in terms of “biological” well-being, measured by recently 
reconstructed anthropometric data from conscription records (A’Hearn and Vecchi, 2011). In 
1861 20-year-old conscripts from the South were on average 3.2 cm shorter than those from 
the Centre and North. Similarly, life expectancy at birth in 1871 (the first year for which we 
have data on all the Italian regions) was 2 years and 2 months shorter in the South than in the 
rest of the country, not a trivial difference considering the very short average life expectancy 
of Italians back then (just over 30 years). In these cases, as with other health indicators such 
as infant mortality, the differences within each macro-region were greater than those 
between them, presumably owing in part to the effect of the acute sensitivity of the 
indicators to micro-geographical conditions arising from environmental factors (for instance, 
the different incidence of malaria). 
Greater still was the divide in what we can consider preconditions for industrial 
development. Some decisive factors, for example the endowment of such primary resources 
as water or nearness to the markets of Europe, were “naturally” concentrated in the North. 
Just consider that the flow rate of rivers, a key indicator of the potential for both internal 
transport and hydro-electric power, was 127 litres per second per inhabitant in the regions of 
the Centre and North (ranging from 247 in Piedmont and Lombardy to 161 in Veneto and 
                                                 
7 In 1861 nearly 30 per cent of total income went to the richest 5 per cent of the population, about double the 
current figure (Amendola, Brandolini and Vecchi, 2001).  
8 Galasso (2010), vol. V, p. 518. 
 
12Friuli-Venezia Giulia) compared with 25 in the South (118 in Campania and 3-4 in Puglia, 
Sicily, Sardinia; Svimez, 1961). The role played by water resources in a country lacking coal 
is essential to understand the pattern of industrial location. 
The South also lagged far behind in other prerequisites: infrastructure, availability of 
human and social capital, and the situation of public order. 
On the first of these factors, Eckaus (1961) reports that on the eve of unification, in 
1859, “outside the North and the Centre, railways were almost a curiosity” and had 
“practically no effect on economic activity”. There were 522 km of track in operation in 
Piedmont, 819 km in the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, 101 in Tuscany, 99 in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and 257 in the Papal States. In proportion to population, the 
high was 1.92 km per 1,000 inhabitants in the Kingdom of Sardinia, against a low of 
scarcely 0.1 in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The situation of the road network was 
similar: in 1863, 4.7 km per 1,000 inhabitants in Piedmont, 6.5 in Lombardy, about 6.2 in the 
Centre but just 1.7 in the continental South and Sardinia, and 1.1 in Sicily. This confirms the 
South’s overland isolation from the rest of Europe, mitigated in part by maritime transport. 
As to human capital, the data presented by A’Hearn, Auria and Vecchi (2011) speak 
clearly: in 1861 the literacy rate in the South was only a third of that in the rest of the 
country (13 against 39 per cent). The primary school enrolment rate for the population aged 
6 to 10 was 17.1 per cent in the South, 67.2 per cent in the Centre and North. As calculated 
by Felice (2007), in 1871 the numbers enrolled in schools up to university amounted to 4.0 
per cent of the corresponding age groups in the South, 5.4 per cent in the North-East and 
Centre, and 10.7 per cent in the North-West. 
Many studies have investigated the disparities that existed in terms of institutional and 
social arrangements. This strand embraces analyses that have focused on the relationship 
between social capital and economic development and studies that have examined land 
ownership rights as a variable able to foster the rise of an industrial bourgeoisie.
9 An aspect 
that has been less thoroughly investigated, but one probably deserving more attention, is the 
differing efficiency of the institutional forms existing in the pre-unification states. Marco 
Meriggi (2001) describes the particularity of the South in its slowness to overcome “feudal 
remnants”, observing that the attempts to modernize the apparatus of central governments 
and local bureaucracies, planned and undertaken in the South, as elsewhere, in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, were far more complex to execute.
10  
                                                 
9 In particular, they contrast the widespread presence of sharecropping in the Centre and North with the 
prevalence in the South of absentee ownership of landed estates, which supposedly did not encourage 
investment in nascent industry. This interpretation, long dominant, is now questioned by some economic 
historians, who “have not found any statistically significant effect of the contractual structure on regional 
differences in factor productivity” (Cohen and Federico, 2001, pp. 49-50).  
10 “here [in the kingdom of Naples] a big gap with the contemporaneous [Milan] experience of the kingdom of 
Italy must be noticed….the concrete implementation of that modernisation project was hindered by the deep-
rooted structure of the society - the feudal system…- as well as by the nature…Bristling with mountains which 
made it impossible a speedy communication within the region…the fragmented territory of the Mezzogiorno 
was significantly less receptive to the administrative project than the wide plain of the Po…Between Milan, 
Venice and Bologna there were numerous and smooth means of communication insuring a speedy and reliable 
transmission of any impulse….The travel time under the italic administration was to remain “extraordinarily 
short” compared with that allowed by the geography of the South…one “day” in the North of 1806 was 
equivalent to three days in the South of the 1840s…The same reasoning outlined in relation to the timing of 
 
13Differences in crime rates and in the effectiveness of law enforcement no doubt 
reflected these social and institutional differences. In 1891, the first year for which criminal 
court statistics are available by region, there were 1,416 reported crimes for each 100,000 
inhabitants in the South, practically double the number in the North (790). The difference 
equally involved crimes of violence, crimes against property and crimes against the public 
order. Crime rates were higher throughout the South (Figure 6), and in some of the major 
regions criminal organizations, then as now, were subtracting resources from the legal 
economy and impeding the formation of indispensable relations of trust and cooperation 
between institutions and citizens. Historians of crime have thoroughly described the 
phenomenon as pertaining particularly to the Calabrian, Sicilian and Neapolitan provinces,
11 
but people were already well aware of it at the time.
12 
In brief, mutual trust between citizens and institutions, certainly not an unimportant 
factor for economic development, was tenuous in the South before unification. Nor did the 
situation improve in the first decades of the united Italy, mainly because of the war 
raged during the first decade after the Italian unification, that was called the banditry 
war but had all the characteristics of a civil war… Banditry together with farmers’ unrest due 
to the unfulfilled land reform gave rise to the never settled territorial split between the North 
and the South of Italy. Moreover, in southern regions the repression favoured the instillation 
and development of criminal organizations, which evolved over time and still play a crucial 
role in this area of the country.
13 
1.2  An inquiry into the late nineteenth century’s industrial geography  
At the time of Italy’s political unification, its industrial apparatus was significantly 
undersized. The most perceptive observers did not take long to discern the environmental 
conditions that hindered the development of manufacturing in Italy by comparison with 
other countries
14 and to describe the structural features that characterized the sectors, size 
and geographical distribution of industry. 
Examining the regional differences in the number of workers in some industries for 
which data for 1876 were available, Vittorio Ellena concluded: 
summarizing, the industrial activities reach their peak in the North of Italy, are lower 
in the Centre and almost absent in the South. The  « Terra di Lavoro », located in the South 
of Italy, represents a kind of oasis in the industrial desert that characterize the area. This gap 
                                                        
entry into force of the laws can be applied to the dynamics of the administrative action…Naples fatally 
remained a distant capital city…and its administrative structures…tended to loose steam on their hard and slow 
way through hostile territory”, Meriggi (2011) pp. 86-88. 
11 Canosa (1991). 
12 Let us cite, for all, the exemplary description by the writer Marco Monnier in the early 1860s of the 
pervasiveness of illegitimate intermediation that the Neapolitan camorra forced on the market in fruits and 
vegetables: “The camorra collected a loading charge, a transport charge, an unloading charge, a distribution 
charge, a charge on retail sales of these products … thereby reducing the profit of the growers and vendors, 
who earned practically nil”. Monnier (1863), p. 58. See also the lengthy account of Monnier’s testimony in 
Barbagallo (2010), chapter 1.  
13 Salvadori (2011), pp. 14-15.  
14 The classic reference is to the work of Vittorio Ellena (Ellena, 1879). 
 
14can be explained by considering that Italian regions differ substantially in terms of wealth 
and skill endowment, but it is mostly due to the lack of communications (which lasts long in 
the South of Italy) and to the less abundance of rivers.
15  
As Ellena himself said, his estimates were certainly incomplete,
16 but the order of 
magnitude of the territorial gap that they measured was truly large. Setting the national 
average for industrial workers’ share of the population equal to 1, the figure was 2.42 in the 
North-West and 0.29 in the South. Although similar indicators that Vera Zamagni calculated 
a century later by combining the industrial statistics with the data of the 1881 population 
census reduce the gap appreciably (1.43 in the “industrial triangle” and 0.80 in the South), 
the differences are still great and not far from today’s figures.
17 
Until just a few years ago, descriptions of the geographical distribution of Italian 
industry that did not resort to purely qualitative sources did not go beyond the levels and 
growth rates of employment in manufacturing. Now, instead, thanks above all to the work of 
Stefano Fenoaltea, we have available to us a vast harvest of systematic statistical information 
on national manufacturing output, broken down by sector and territory, in the early post-
unification decades. In 1871 the value added of manufacturing in the South trailed that in the 
rest of the country by some 20 points on a per capita basis and by about 8 points in relation 
to GDP (Table 3). Campania was the sole region of the South with per capita indicators 
above the national average. 
The recent data also allow us to fully appreciate the impressive gain in the relative 
position of the North-West in the period up to First World War. We know, of course, that it 
was in the “industrial triangle” that modern Italian industry was born. As to industry in the 
South, though lagging behind the national average it hardly disappeared. On the eve of the 
war manufacturing value added at constant prices was 2.6 times greater in the South than it 
had been in 1861 (Figure 7), almost on a par with the gain achieved by the Centre and North-
East (whose production tripled), while in the North-West the multiple was equal to 4.3.
18 
But let’s return to 1871, because the progress in statistical sources enables us to 
investigate the sectoral and territorial breakdown of the differences in industrialization. The 
sectoral breakdown is important because it allows us to discover if and to what extent the 
poorer performance of southern manufacturing was due to an unfavourable composition 
                                                 
15 Ellena, p. 42. 
16 “The statistics published last year do not include the mining, metal and mechanical industries and those 
involved in the production of glass, ceramics and chemical products….And my work here also fails to account 
for the employment in homemade spinning, which is a relevant industry in nearly all provinces of our country.” 
Ellena, pp. 34-35. In spite of these limits, Ellena’s statistics probably capture the most dynamic and substantial 
part of Italian manufacturing. Epicarmo Corbino estimated that they covered about three quarters of Italian 
industry of the day (Corbino, p. 1954, p. 93). 
17 Zamagni (1987), pp. 36-97. Zamagni’s data refer to the regions’ current administrative borders, Ellena’s to 
their contemporary boundaries. 
18 The relative shrinking of southern industry only marginally involved large firms. Lawually, the number of 
industrial limited share companies grew at a slightly faster rate in the South than nationwide. If in 1865 just 8 
of Italy’s 134 industrial limited share companies (about 6 per cent) were located in the South, by 1916 the 
South was home to 247 out 1,518 (about 14 per cent), and now the aggregate also includes the Veneto region. 
In terms of total capital, the South’s share increased from 4.1 to 8.3 per cent. In 1916 there were still more 
limited share companies in industry in Campania than in Tuscany or Emilia, and only slightly fewer than in 
Veneto (Svimez, 1954).  
 
15effect, while the geographical breakdown, especially if pushed below the regional level, is 
useful for understanding whether the average difference between the rates of 
industrialization in the macro-areas actually conceals significantly dissimilar trends. 
From the sectoral viewpoint, at the time of national unification the differences between 
the North and South were not enormous. However, in 1871 the South was specialized to a 
greater extent in industries that would have low relative growth rates in the following 
decades. In particular, classifying the 12 sectors for which data are available according to 
their performance in the next 40 years, we find that in the South the sectors with the poorest 
future growth (food products and tobacco, leather and footwear) accounted for almost half of 
manufacturing value added, more than 5 points more than in the Centre and North (Table 4). 
However, more important than the macro-areas’ initial specialization was the different 
growth rate of the “modern” sectors. Between 1871 and 1911 value added in basic metals, 
engineering and chemicals grew at average annual rates of respectively 8.8, 4.3 and 6.3 per 
cent in the North-West, compared with 6.8, 3.9 and 5.6 per cent in the Centre and the North-
East and substantially lower rates in the South (4.3, 2.3 and 4.8 per cent).  
Consequently, the alteration in the sectoral composition of industry was much less 
radical in the South than in the North-West.
19 The changes were largely determined by the 
two main sectors: the share of the food products industry, the least dynamic, fell by fully 16 
percentage points in the North-West and by only 8 in the South, while engineering, the most 
dynamic sector, gained 11 points in the industrial triangle and only 3 in the South.
20 
As for the detailed geographical distribution of industrial growth rates – by province – 
the first observation concerns how large a part of each macro-area was involved in 
industrialization to an appreciable extent (Table 5). By this gauge, in 1871 the North-West 
already had a large lead on the rest of the country: 8 of the 14 provinces of Piedmont, 
Liguria and Lombardy, had overall industrialization rates more than 10 points above the 
national average, 13 of them had a lead of this size in at least one branch of manufacturing (6 
in engineering).
21 A similar snapshot taken in 1911 shows substantially no change in the 
Centre and North, and a reduction in the heavily industrialized territory in the South, where 
practically the province of Naples alone continued to claim some prominence on the national 
scale. 
These trends are not merely a detail of the widening geographical gap in the country’s 
industrialization during the period under consideration. On the contrary, to some extent they 
capture one of its causes, especially if one believes that the presence of highly-specialized 
industry constitutes a structural strength for a local economy in view of the economies of 
agglomeration that can arise from the territorial concentration of production. 
                                                 
19 Between the start and the end of the period considered, the index of dissimilarity of the composition of 
industry is equal to 26.1 in the South, 27.7 in the North-East, 39.7 in the Centre and 48-7 in the North-West 
(Table 4, last column). 
20 On the history of the engineering industry in the South and its underdevelopment at the start of the twentieth 
century, see De Rosa (1968), p. 203. 
21 By contrast, high overall industrialization rates could be found in only 2 of 16 provinces in the North-East, 3 
of 14 in the Centre and 2 of 25 in the South. 
 
16In this sense, it is likely that the greater density of specialized areas that the North-
West already displayed in 1871 helped to determine its industrial success in the decades to 
come thanks to the self-reinforcement of locational advantages, a pattern that a host of 
theorists of the so-called New Economic Geography have highlighted but that Marshall had 
already described precisely in the years we are examining.
22 In short, our interest in the 
micro-geographical distribution of Italian industries stems from the idea that in assessing an 
economic system’s development potential over time it is necessary to take into account its 
initial endowment of manufacturing poles and the possible consequent phenomena of spatial 
correlation in growth. 
Hence it may be useful to delve more deeply into territorial details of the disparities in 
industrialization, using a geographical scale and a metric to measure industrial concentration 
similar to those employed in constructing recent maps of Italy’s industrial clusters.
23 
The statistics we have for 1871 do not contain all the necessary data, which we have 
estimated as described in the methodological note.
24 The territories we analyse are the 284 
“administrative districts”, i.e. the smallest geographical unit considered in the 1871 census.
25 
Applying the specialization test, we find that 46 of them had a significantly higher 
concentration of employment in a given sector than their share of the population (Table 6). 
The regional distribution of the phenomenon, particularly the share of manufacturing 
employment located in the “specialized” districts, does not differ appreciably from the 
pattern found with provincial data (Table 5), showing an incidence of specialization in the 
North-West practically double that of the rest of the country and, more in general, a wider 
divide between western and eastern Italy than between the North and the South. 
What “locational advantages” could the Italian territories offer in 1871? In places that 
still had not experienced a genuine industrial take-off, it is doubtful there had been sufficient 
time for the formation of economies of agglomeration. So the territorial concentration of 
manufacturing activities could have depended on the endowment of natural resources (for 
example, port facilities for shipbuilding) or the size of the market within reach in terms of 
effective demand. 
This thesis seems to be borne out by the fact that the “specialized districts” had a 
median population of nearly 143,000, more than double that of the rest of the districts 
                                                 
22 Marshall (1890), Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan). 
23 As Iuzzolino (2004) points out, a statistically correct identification of these territories requires the 
construction of a statistical test to check whether the degree of manufacturing specialization resulting from the 
data is not purely random. The test selects the areas – sub-provincial – where share of the population employed 
in a given industry exceeds the area’s share of the total population and checks that such “specialization” does 
not depend on the random distribution of firms over the nation’s territory. The areas identified in this way 
presumably offer locational advantages to the firms of that sector. However, the test is not able to distinguish 
the nature of those advantages, which consequently may depend on the presence of favourable natural 
conditions, on the size of the accessible market, or on the creation over time of a virtuous circle between the 
density of specialized firms and the local availability of tangible and intangible resources serving the sector.  
24 Given the number of estimation procedures we have used and their inevitable imprecision, the map of the 
specialized territories that we describe in what follows needs to be taken as a rough approximation of the “true” 
geographical distribution of what we might call “proto industrial clusters”. 
25 The administrative district, an intermediate entity between province and municipality, was instituted in the 
Kingdom of Italy in 1859 by the Rattazzi Law (Royal Decree 3702 of 23 October 1859). It was the new name 
given to what had been “provinces” in the Kingdom of Sardinia, corresponding to arrondisssements in France.  
 
17(64,000). Table 7 shows that most of the specialized districts were also more populous (37 of 
the 46 specialized districts had at least 100,000 inhabitants). But the converse did not hold: 
65 per cent of these “large” districts had no industrial specialization. Volume of demand was 
therefore probably a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the formation of clusters. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that the share of “large” administrative districts with a 
high density of industry districts was fairly similar in the North-West, North-East and Centre 
but drastically lower – only half as great – in the South.
26 Nearly four-fifths of the more 
populous southern administrative districts (37 out of 48
27), districts with good potential local 
demand, had no significant specialization in manufacturing. 
In brief, in the South in 1871 the local size of the market appears to have been a 
necessary condition – there were no specialized districts with a population under 100,000 – 
but not a sufficient condition. In the rest of the country, the same factor appears instead to 
have acted as an (almost) sufficient condition – fewer that 9 per cent of the large districts did 
not have a pronounced specialization in industry – but not a necessary condition, because a 
quarter of the specialized districts did not have a large population. Consequently, if there 
were locational advantages independent of the local volume of demand, they can be 
presumed to have been concentrated in some parts of the Centre and North. 
In so far as the economies of agglomeration deriving from pronounced territorial 
specialization translate into productivity advantages,
28 this finding is consistent with the 
considerable disparities in industrial value added per worker reported by Felice (2007): in 
1891 this indicator stood at half the national average in the South, whereas in the Centre and 
North-East it exceeded the national average by 11 per cent and in the North-West by 52 per 
cent. 
29 
Holding district population equal, almost half of the industrial poles in 1871 (21 of 46) 
had particularly low illiteracy rates; this share was very high in the North-West (15 of 18) 
and nil in the South. We find a similar variance in the endowment of communication and 
transport infrastructure (measured by the share of the population residing in municipalities 
equipped with post and telegraph offices, railway stations or ports), which was decidedly 
higher than the average in the industrial poles of the North-West and minimal in those of the 
South.
30 
                                                 
26 This result does not change when we weight the population by the literacy rate, so as to obtain a size 
parameter more closely correlated with effective demand (assuming that literacy also indicates economic 
wellbeing). 
27 Among the 37 large, unspecialized districts, we find many territories (Caserta, Castellammare, Foggia, 
L’Aquila, Teramo, Cosenza, etc.) that qualitative descriptions of Bourbon industry had instead counted as 
significant industrial poles. This may have been true on the southern scale, but no longer on the national scale. 
28 Cingano and Schivardi (2005). 
29 The data refer to the whole industrial sector, not just manufacturing. Additional statistical evidence showing 
that the structure of the industrial poles was more fragile in the South are reported in Table 8. For example, 
none of the 11 poles in the South specialized chiefly in engineering, compared with 7 out of 35 poles in the 
Centre and North. Further, 7 of the 11 relatively industrialized administrative districts in the South had a single 
specialization, whereas in the rest of the country this was true in fewer than half the cases (17).  
30 Table 7 shows, moreover, whether at least some of the “specialized” territories of 1871 continued to be 
included in the industrial clusters found using the data from the industrial censuses conducted 40, 80 and 130 
years later. The greater persistence of the territories belonging to the Centre and North is striking: 80 per cent 
 
18Examining the birth rate of industrial clusters between 1871 and 1911, we obtain 
interesting confirmation of the fact that southern industry, though failing to keeping pace 
with other parts of the country, not only did not vanish but actually expanded to some extent. 
In 1911 the administrative districts belonging to industrial agglomerations, identified on the 
basis of the industrial census of that year, numbered 72, of which 32 coincide with the 
specialized districts of 1871 and 40 do not. Figure 8 depicts the share of these two sets in 
relation to the total population in 1871, divided by macro-area. In the South, as in the rest of 
Italy, we see an extension in the area (measured by population in the chart, but the same 
holds in terms of territory) with a relatively high degree of industrial specialization, albeit to 
a lesser degree than in the country as a whole owing to lower “birth” and higher “death” 
rates. Further, in 1911 the South’s share of total employment in Italy’s industrial clusters 
was still small compared with the North-West’s (11.7 against 74.2 per cent; Table 9), but it 
was only a little lower than the sum of those of the North-East and Centre (14.1 per cent), 
thanks above all to the high density of industry in the Naples district, the country’s leading 
cluster in the leather and footwear sector. As will be seen, the picture changes dramatically 
with the snapshot taken in 1951, when the South’s share of total employment in the 
industrial clusters collapsed to 2.6 per cent (Table 10), owing among other things to the 
disappearance of Naples from the ranks of Italy’s “industrial centres”.  
 
1.3  Industry, agriculture, migrations and policy: gaps widen 
By all evidence, then, the North-South gap in economic development was created and 
accentuated by the onset of industrialization (Figure 9), which is no surprise given the 
differences in initial conditions propitious for agglomeration economies: the size of 
reachable local markets (and access to external markets)
31; energy resources; skilled labour 
and entrepreneurial aptitude; the presence of proto-district craft clusters even in medium-
sized and smaller cities and towns. These features and others (the development of the credit 
system, simultaneously cause and effect of industrialization
32) tended to reinforce one 
another. 
But the output gap was not the product of industrialization alone. Decades after 
national unification there was also a divergence in productivity growth in agriculture that 
                                                        
were still counted among the clusters in 2001, against just over a third of those in the South. The survival rate 
to 1911 was 86 per cent for the territories with low illiteracy and 52 per cent for the others.  
31 The main impediment to industrialization was “the persistently limited market for consumer goods. The 
mechanical engineering industries that had developed thanks to protectionism under the Bourbons before 
national unity, for example, failed to make the transition to private enterprise not for lack of management skill 
but because of the scarcity of market opportunities.” Southern agriculture created much less demand than 
northern for industrial products like machinery and fertilizer. The absence of a stable class of farmers meant 
that no mass consumer market could arise. Consequently, far fewer virtuous circles came into being between 
industrial, financial and agricultural markets, of the sort that characterized the North-West (Davis, 1999, p. 
234-5). 
32 A significant factor accompanying and sustaining the rise of industry in Italy was the formation of modern 
banks, first of all Banca Commerciale and Credito Italiano, established during those years in the North-West at 
the initiative of foreign capital. The role of banking is emphasized in particular by Alexander Gerschenkron 
(1963). In the South, although credit expanded thanks to many cooperative banks, it played a much smaller 
role; and its development was much more halting than in the North, as is attested by the large number of 
cooperative bank failures (Ferri and Trento, 1997; A’Hearn, 2000). 
 
19explains a good part of the overall widening of the gap (Federico, 2007). From the 1890s 
onward the industrial development of the North-West was paralleled by a deep farming 
slump in the South, owing to three concomitant factors: the closure of market outlets with 
the simultaneous protectionist measures of other European countries, above all France; the 
tariff protection of wheat; and the international agrarian crisis.
33 The South immediately lost 
major export outlets. Exports of citrus fruit fell from 2.3 million quintals in 1887 to 1.4 
million in 1891; those of oil from 641 million in 1887 to 378 million in 1890 (Pescosolido, 
1998). In one  year, wine exports collapsed from 2 million hectoliters to just tens of 
thousands, ruining the grape farmers (Rossi Doria, 1982). 
Northern farming reacted better. Eckaus (1960) notes that the “agricultural 
improvement” of the time came almost exclusively in the North. Davis (1999) dates to the 
end of the century the rise in the North of true agrarian capitalism and the consequent 
development of credit networks, as is shown by Ferri and Trento (1997). In short, when the 
agrarian crisis hit, 
Italy was caught completely off guard by the crisis that hence was pretty harmful. In 
the Centre-North farmers tried to react by relying on technological innovation and by 
organizing themselves into association. But, with few exceptions, this way was not followed 
in the South where the setback to the development of this productive sector was worsened by 
the explosion of social conflicts (Rossi Doria, 1982). 
The deep market slump in modern, specialized, export-oriented farming was an 
especially severe blow to the regions where it had been most developed, Puglia and Sicily. 
Over the next twenty years, farm productivity in Puglia (value added per worker) fell from 
162 per cent of the Italian average to 110 per cent, and in Sicily from 166 to 140 per cent 
(Felice, 2007, Table 3.3). That is, the crisis went to the vital heart of the southern economy, 
leaving only the skin and bones and opening the way to mass emigration (Davis, 1999).
34 
There was no way of replacing these foreign markets with domestic outlets. Apart 
from the greater cost of land rather than sea transport, the reason was above all the lack of 
demand for southern farm products in the Centre and North of Italy. The South did not 
produce the raw materials that northern manufacturing needed, much of which were 
imported from abroad. It was not in a position to supply grain or livestock products, of 
which it too had a shortfall. Owing to still low incomes, there was insufficient demand for its 
specialized fruit and vegetable products (Zamagni, 1993). Yet between the turn of the 
century and the outbreak of the First World War the South made anything but negligible 
                                                 
33 Starting in 1880 farm crops were hit by a major international crisis in connection with soaring output around 
the world and the advances in transportation that made possible the mass arrival of foodstuffs from outside 
Europe. After the long period of rising prices, there was a collapse, “varied and unevenly distributed over the 
years but averaging more than 30%” (Rossi Doria, 1982). Wheat fell from 35 to 20 lire a quintal. The customs 
tariff, which was raised from 3 lire in 1887 to 7.50 lire in 1894, stabilized the price at around 25 lire, but “the 
artificial support for wheat had the effect of distorting the economic advantage of other crops” (Rossi Doria, 
1982). 
34 Per capita GDP in Puglia fell from 95 per cent of the national average in 1891 to 78 per cent in 1911 (Daniele 
and Malanima, 2007, Table 5); in Sicily, from 98 to 88 per cent. This did not happen in the rest of the South. In 
Campania, both the relative decline in farm productivity and the fall in overall output were much more 
moderate: from 110 per cent of Italian per capita GDP in 1891, Campania was still at 105 per cent 20 years 
later. 
 
20progress, “roughly on a par with the North” (Rossi Doria, 1982). The gains involved both 
technical advances and rural modernization: 
The establishment of the itinerant universities and of the agrarian consortiums, the 
progresses of the credit system, the institution of the first labour unions, the interesting 
phenomenon of the collective “affittanze” in Sicily, the development of farming properties in 
the areas of immigration and the improvement of the general standard of living all date back 
to those years. On the eve of the war, hence, there was ground for a gradual, albeit modest, 
autonomous economic development at least of some southern regions.
35 
Citrus exports rose from 2 million quintals a year in 1894-1901 to 4 million in 1913-14 
(Bevilacqua, 1993), even though irrigation remained very modest: 1.5 per cent of farmland 
in the South compared with 7.9 per cent in the North (Svimez, 2011). Thus in 1911, despite 
the pronounced drop over the preceding twenty years, several southern regions still 
outperformed the national average in agricultural productivity (Felice, 2007, Table 3.3; 
Federico, 2007, Table 5). 
Migration also played a role in the dynamics of regional disparities: fifteen years after 
unification, Italy experienced an extraordinary wave of emigration, with an estimated 14 
million emigrants between 1876 and 1914. Through the end of the nineteenth century 
emigration was highest in the North-East and especially in Veneto, because of its vicinity to 
the most attractive European destinations and “as a reflection of the conditions most 
favourable to leaving which, within a general context of backwardness made it possible to 
plan and undertake a journey for a period of work abroad” (Felice, 2007). In the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, the ratio of gross emigration to total population
36 was still higher 
in the Centre-North: an average of around 1 per cent per year, compared to 0.6 per cent 
(1890-94) and 0.9 per cent (1895-1900) in the South. After the turn of the century, however, 
emigration accelerated, especially in the South, where the average annual ratio jumped to 1.7 
per cent in 1900-1904 (surpassing the Centre-North) and then to 2.4 per cent in 1905-1909 
and 2 percent in 1910-1914. 
The emigrants’ destinations were quite diverse. During the period 1876-1914, 62 per 
cent of emigrants from the North-West and 74 per cent from the North-East (87 per cent for 
Veneto) went to European and Mediterranean countries. This was the case for just 9 per cent 
of emigrants from the South (Felice, 2007), who chose almost exclusively to go to the 
Americas. This divergence would influence repatriation rates, which tended to be low for the 
southern regions. Rossi Doria (1982) indicates that of the one and a half million southerners 
who emigrated during the nineteenth century, one million never repatriated. 
The repatriation rate was a determining factor in the medium and long-term effects of 
emigration on economic growth in the regions of origin. While emigration deprived those 
regions of dynamic and enterprising human resources, repatriation attenuated the effects of 
this loss of human capital. Higher repatriation rates were also associated with greater 
emigrant remittances in favor of the local economy.
37 
                                                 
35 Rossi Doria 1982, p 191. 
36 Calculated on the basis of the data in Svimez, 2011, pp. 129 et seq. 
37 Felice (2007) notes that “the advantages of remittances went primarily to the regions of the Centre-North.” 
The impact of emigration on local economies is nevertheless complex and difficult to measure. One example is 
 
21With regard to short-term effects, it is estimated that international migrations 
accentuated the contemporary North-South gap by about 2 percentage points between 1881 
and 1901, while their effect in the following decade was negligible (Table 11).  
The role of policy. – Like demographics, policy also failed to keep the gaps from 
widening. Awareness of the existence of a “Southern question” came very early on
38, but in 
the second half of the nineteenth century financial investments associated with public policy 
were decidedly low compared to European and Italian standards in the final decades of the 
twentieth. Up to the First World War, overall spending by the central government and local 
administrations rarely approached one fifth of GDP. Moreover, central government spending 
consisted very largely of interest on the public debt and armaments (Cohen and Federico, 
2001. p.91). Public works spending was little more than 10 per cent of the total; 
redistributive spending was very low, less than 1 per cent of total spending for the entire 
nineteenth century, while spending for education, also low in 1870 (3.2 per cent of public 
spending, or 0.5 per cent of GDP) increased constantly until it doubled its relative portion of 
public spending on the eve of the Great War (Zamigni 1993). 
Comparing these orders of magnitude with those related to the many and complex 
aspects of the disparities that existed in Italy (in addition to, naturally, the more general 
condition of the country’s overall backwardness compared to the rest of Europe), it is 
difficult to imagine any way that Italy’s first unified public policies could have achieved a 
rapid geographical realignment. 
The most conspicuous measures directed primarily to the South were those aimed at 
improving transportation networks. Between 1861 and 1875 the South went from 7.2 per 
cent of the national rail network to 32 per cent. Nevertheless, according to some historians, 
the country’s north-south rail connections, owing partly to particularly high fares, failed to 
bring about the creation of a national market or even a significant increase in interregional 
commerce; “the railways were built not to be used” (Fenoaltea, 2006); the purpose was more 
the military one of controlling the national territory, especially in the South, than favouring 
commerce. Nitti had noted that railway fares acted in many cases as customs duties, making 
it more economic for the South to export goods abroad by sea rather than try to sell its 
products to the North via railway (Nitti, 1993). Opinion is divided about the role of the 
railways in Italy’s economic  development (Cannari and Chiri, 2002). According to Romeo 
(1959) industrialization followed, both chronologically and causally, the construction of the 
railways, but Gerschenkron (1962) argues that the Italian industrial system was not 
sufficiently developed to benefit from the development of the country’s rail network. In any 
event, Fenoaltea (2007) points out that the infrastructures that had the biggest impact on 
development were the railways in the North-West, which were initiated in large part before 
national unification. 
Furthermore, the substantial increase of investment in Southern railways was 
countered by a significant reduction in rural reclamation projects compared to the pre-
unification period (Pescosolido, 1998). The 1862 reclamation law entrusted the execution of 
such projects to private enterprise, “effectively favoring northern regions where the most 
                                                        
the much debated question of whether or not emigration produced an increase in wages and salaries in the 
regions of origin by restricting the supply of labour. 
38 The first important studies were begun just ten years after unification. 
 
22extensive marshlands were concentrated and where there were numerous consortia of land 
owners” (Atella, Francisci and Vecchi, 2011, p. 109). In the South, the amount of 
reclamation to be done was enormous, beyond the potential profitability for private 
enterprises; there it was necessary “literally to create the plains, ensure the elemental 
conditions for human habitation, restore the land . . . to populations that for centuries, owing 
to the insecurity of the coastal areas and other historical causes, had been forced to abandon 
it” (Bevilacqua and Rossi Doria, 1984). Before fascism the South received just 4 per cent of 
spending on reclamation, and the land area involved was only 9 per cent of the national total 
(Cafiero, 1996). 
In the Age of Giolitti before the First World War, public investment in the South 
intensified, as can be seen in the expenditure summaries of the Ministry of Public Works 
reported in D’Antone (2011a). Spending for continued railway development was joined by 
investments in roads and ports, and work was begun on the construction of the Apulian 
aqueduct. The sum total of infrastructure investment contributed to the modernization of 
North and South, but it was not such as to modify the relative advantage of locating 
productive activities in the two regions; on the contrary, the imbalance was probably 
accentuated.   
In other important areas of national policy as well, the impact on the South’s initial 
deficit appears, as with the railways, to have been substantial enough to improve previous 
levels but insufficient to narrow the gap. Let us consider two examples, education and public 
health. With regard to education, the Casati Act went into effect for the whole country in 
1859:  
according to the law, school enrolment (for pupils aged 6) had to be compulsory and 
free of charge. The educational system was divided into two grades, primary and secondary, 
each one lasting two years. Each municipality had to provide almost two primary schools, 
one for male and one for female. However, difficulties in the adoption of the rule on 
compulsory school enrolment, which was primarily due to the lack of effective sanctions, 
arisen as the law was applied to the whole country.
39  
Successive studies of the education system conducted in the years following the law’s 
implementation continued to demonstrate the backwardness of the structure and functioning 
of the Italian school system, and the relatively worse situation in the southern regions. 
The unequal tax base of the local finances prevented a massive effort for raising the 
levels of primary education in the most disadvantaged areas (the countryside)”; in 1910 the 
Corradini’s inquiry underlines the inadequacy of resources invested in the regions of the 
Mezzogiorno for bridging the gap in the education system, hinting that the decentralised 
fiscal system had led to the strengthening of the existing structures, thereby fostering the 
concentration of State-sponsored competitions in the big cities and communities already 
sufficiently endowed with schools.
40 
                                                 
39 A’Hearn, Auria e Vecchi 2011, p. 164. 
40 Zamagni 1993, p. 220. According to some recent interpretations, however, the lesser financial capacity of 
southern municipalities did not depend only on the disparities in the tax base: “it would seem, therefore, that 
quite apart from their average local economic conditions, northern municipalities, much more frequently than 
their southern counterparts, deliberately chose forms of taxation favourable to the development of basic 
community services, including education”(A’Hearn, Auria e Vecchi 2011). 
 
23It was not until 1911, fifty years after unification, that the Daneo-Credaro Act 
established national funding for elementary education. This choice proved to be a notable 
step forward in the fight against illiteracy, even though in just a few years, “the outbreak of 
war would be a decisive blow, diverting the government’s attention away from education 
and postponing all public investment” (A’Hearn, Auria and  Vecchi 2011, pp.167-8). 
With the 1865 adoption of the Rattazzi Act, previously in effect in the Kingdom of 
Piedmont, the local representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were entrusted with 
the protection of public health, and the burden of financing health services was placed on 
municipalities, which were required to provide health care for the poor through medical 
officers. Health policies (including the Pagliani Act of 1888 and later provisions for the 
distribution of quinine), slowly but steadily improved the overall quality of life but did not 
alter internal regional imbalances. In 1881, Italy’s average per capita spending for medical 
officers came to 492 lire, but all the regions of the South were well under that figure, with 
lows of around 150 lire in Sicily and Campania, and the reform of 1888, because of the way 
it was structured – especially its disproportionate burden of spending for municipalities, 
“was a factor in consolidating the territorial imbalances between more and less developed 
areas” (Atella, Francisci, and Vecchi, 2011). In 1885 there were 134 hospital beds per 
thousand inhabitants in the North-West, 138 in the North-East, and only 44 in the South 
(Felice, 2007). 
A much debated point is the hypothesized transfer of capital from South to North 
caused by geographical asymmetries between tax revenues and public spending. Unification 
brought with it the consolidation of public debt, two-thirds of which was carried over from 
Piedmont (Cafiero, 1996). Net of spending for the wars of independence, per capita public 
debt in Piedmont was 188 lire compared to 84 for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and 55 
for the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Unification of the debt thus meant “a transfer of real 
resources from the South to the North” (Toniolo, 1988). The same may also be true for 
taxation, which like public spending was particularly low in the pre-unification South.
41 But 
on this point there is no conclusive empirical evidence or agreement among historians 
(Cohen and Federico, 2001, pp. 36-37). 
An important role in reinforcing the localization dynamics of Italian industry may have 
been played by industrial policies and, in particular, the high concentration of public 
contracts among several mechanical engineering firms prevalently located in the North. 
Complete quantitative evidence, however, is lacking. Fenoaltea (1982) shows that between 
1861 and 1913 public contracts in the railway sector did not exceed 10 per cent of the value 
added in the national mechanical engineering industry. Contracts related to the arms industry 
were more substantial (Pescosolido, 1998; Federico and O’Rourke, 2000). To be sure, there 
was no lack of perception on the part of contemporary observers that conducting economic 
policy in support of industry could have important consequences on the geography of Italian 
economic development.  
The observer who most clearly understood this relationship was Francesco Saverio 
Nitti. While he did not oppose public policies in support of industry, he grasped their 
                                                 
41 On the basis of a complex and detailed reconstruction of the data concerning central government revenues 
and spending, Nitti (1900) argues that in the period he examined (1894-98), but very probably since 
unification, per capita tax revenues were greater in the South than in the North. 
 
24geographically differentiated distributive effects. As a result he was the first strong advocate 
not of reducing support for industry but of implementing specific economic policy measures 
to ensure that industrial localization would benefit the entire country, and especially the 
South. Abandoning the traditional view of the South as a land exclusively suited to 
agriculture, he placed special emphasis on the potential role of Naples as a great modern 
industrial city with propulsive effects on the entire South and on the importance of electric 
power plants in the South. 
Elected to Parliament in 1904, Nitti proposed “Special Provisions for Naples,” a 
package of measures to favor industry, among them a quota of public mechanical 
engineering contracts, customs exemptions on imports of equipment for the initial 
establishment of industrial plants, measures aimed at establishing a hydroelectric industry 
that would exploit the Volturno river( Barone, 1986). In 1909 the big industrial plant in 
Bagnoli went into operation; the Volturno Power Authority was set up. In the judgment of 
Bevilacqua (1993), they “surely had a positive effect on the Neapolitan economy, whose 
industry experienced a remarkable recovery.” 
Also in 1904 the special legislation, with similar measures, was extended to Basilicata, 
then to Calabria and the rest of the southern provinces. The package of provisions also 
contained funding for the construction of elementary schools, the institution of schools for 
illiterate adults, and salary increases for teachers in rural schools (A’Hearn, Auria, and 
Vecchi, 2001), as well as public reclamation projects, reforestation, and roads, accompanied 
by tax relief and farm loans (Zamagni, 1993, p. 218). The Nitti-Sacchi Act of 1911 assigned 
to the central government the entire burden for the water management and forest protection 
in the mountain basins that are so important for the South (Zamagni , 1993, p.71).
42  
1.4  First period balance sheet: the situation as of 1911 
In the decades around the turn of the century the regional gaps widened. The process 
of divergence was simultaneous with the country’s industrial development, as would be 
expected given the tendency to geographical concentration, as industrial  activities 
strengthened themselves in those areas where they first began to have success, 
corresponding, in the Italian case, to the industrial triangle. But the dimensions and the 
structural features of the gaps were far from the dramatic levels that would mark the 
following decades, and they were normal by international standards, maintaining an 
intermediate position with respect to the low German figure and the very high figures for the 
components of the Hapsburg empire (Table 1).   
The characteristic North-South split became even more marked in these decades, with 
a divergence of GDP amounting to 26 percentage points, but the East-West gap also 
widened, reaching 18 points (Figure 1). 
                                                 
42 In the judgment of Bevilacqua (1993), however, taken altogether, “these special provisions were not as 
effective as the ones adopted for Naples,” not least because of the lack of “adequate financial support,” and 
their management by local ruling classes. Davis (1999) emphasizes the political opposition to Nitti’s measures 
from southern land owners and the action of the executive branch of the central government which assigned 
exclusively to Northern companies the contracts for work in the port of Naples and land reclamation in 




25Considering how far behind it was at unification, the absolute growth of the southern 
economy over the next fifty years was certainly not negligible. At constant prices and in 
relation to population, GDP increased 1.5 times, and industrial production 1.8 times. The 
incidence of absolute poverty to population in the South went from 52 to 43 percent (Vecchi, 
2011, Table S20). 
Most important, all the southern regions experienced strong improvements in their 
indicators of well-being, although again in this case they were lower than the national 
average. Between 1861 and 1911 life expectancy at birth, virtually unchanged for centuries, 
increased by nearly 16 years in Italy and by about 11 years in the South (Vecchi, 2011, Table 
S6). The infant mortality rate fell in every southern region by between a fourth and a third (-
37 per cent in Italy; Vecchi, 2011, Table S7). With regard to changes in physical stature in 
the first decades after unification, “the spectacular reduction of the biological inequalities 
found in southern Italy”
43 suggests that living conditions in that part of the country had 
registered progress of a dimension never experienced up to that time. 
With regard to education we take as our reference point the threshold of 40 per cent 
literacy, believed by many historians to be the minimum requisite at that time for modern 
economic development (Felice, 2007). At unification, this threshold had been reached only 
by the three regions of the North-West and even in 1881 it had been attained only by the 
northern regions and Lazio (Vecchi, 2011, Table S10). By 1911 no region of Italy was under 
45 per cent, with the exception of Calabria, but the North-South gap was still very wide. The 
remarkable disparity between Centre-North and South in gross rates of enrollment in 
elementary schools of children aged 6-10 had been reduced by half as of 1901 (Vecchi, 
2011, Table S12). By 1911, the incidence of child labour, which in 1881 in the South 
excluding Sardinia still ranged from 70.2 per cent in Campania to 92.7 per cent in Calabria, 
had retreated to levels slightly above or below 50 per cent in all the regions, shrinking to 
levels similar to those reached by the North-West 30 years earlier (Vecchi, 2011, Table S9). 
Health, education, and income indicators saw a drop in internal variability within the 
macro-areas, a symptom of progress not limited to single geographical areas. 
In drawing up a balance sheet of united Italy’s first fifty years, D’Antone (2011a) 
writes: “at least until the First World War, the still physiological North-South divergence 
was not deliberately constructed by virtue of political decisions to the disadvantage of the 
South, but it was even acceptable in a country whose productive system was highly 
differentiated, and did not constitute the fatal condition for the ever steeper decline of the 
southern regions.” We agree. 
2.  War, fascism, war: the gap explodes (1914-1950) 
The physiological or at least unsurprising widening of the gaps in the first fifty years 
of united Italy was followed by forty years in which those divergences intensified to reach 
decidedly anomalous proportions (Figure 2), also by international standards (Table1). The 
trend is clear and for the first time it follows a North-South gradient. Between 1911 and 
1951 all the regions of the South visibly lost ground, while all those of the Centre-North, 
                                                 
43 A’Hearn-Vecchi, 2011, cit. p. 69. 
 
26with the exception of Umbria,
44 gained ground (Figure 5). Overall, per capita output in the 
South went from 83 to 53 per cent of per capita output in the Centre-North.
45  
Very probably, much more than by the nature of initial industrialization, the true 
geographical fracture in Italian history was created by the experience of the world wars and 
the dictatorship. This period, therefore, is deserving of special attention.
46 
The First World War is of fundamental importance (Zamagni, 2002); it marks a break 
in previous trends. Overall, “the war subordinated every aspect of social life to increasing 
Italy’s industrial potential” and it “determined a new dislocation of the country’s resources 
in favour of industry, encouraged financial agglomerations, and reinforced protectionist 
practices”(Castronovo, 1975). 
The war effected a remarkable growth in the role of the public sector. The national 
deficit grew to dizzying heights, postponing adjustment problems to the post-war years. 
Between the second half of the teens and the first half of the twenties the debt of the public 
administrations grew 10-fold in absolute terms, and the ratio to GDP rose from 80 to 140 per 
cent (Francese-Pace, 2008). 
The corresponding increase in spending, however, was nearly all directed at war-
fighting needs (defence spending approached three-quarters of total public spending; MEF-
RGS 2011, Table 20), and particularly for military production, which was by a very large 
margin prevalently located in the North. At the end of the war, 1,116 of the nearly 2,000 
plants declared to be auxiliary were located in the industrial triangle; but the proportion is 
even greater in the case of metallurgical (170 out of 204) and mechanical engineering plants 
(409 out of 558) (Zamagni, 1993).
47  
State support for the defence industry, vast and diversified, created effects that were 
destined to last; among them, and decisive for regional questions, was the process of 
geographical concentration of industry in areas where it had already been established: “with 
some significant spillover effect in Emilia, Veneto and Tuscany ... The war proved to be a 
bad deal for the South of the country” (Zamagni, 1993). 
Interrelationships between political decision-makers and industrial groups intensified; 
that is, what Castronovo (1975) defines as “intimate relations between government economic 
policy and business strategies”, which would take on great importance in the following years 
and which already in this period give rise to company bailouts immediately following the 
war (in particular the bailouts of Ansaldo and Ilva in Liguria) and in general bring about a 
concentration of  “profits in the groups tied to war supplies and materiel” (Romeo, 1988). 
                                                 
44 As well as Lazio, according to the data in Brunetti et al (2011). 
45 This according to the data of Daniele and Malanima (2007) (regarding present regional boundaries); but the 
indication is very much the same also on the basis of the data in Brunetti et al (2011), using the regional 
boundaries of the time: per capita output went from 76 to 49 per cent. 
46 To be sure, it could be submitted that this period was characterized by a mere unfolding of effects set in 
motion during the Age of Giolitti, but even if it were so automatic (and it does not seem so in light of some 
fundamental circumstances pertaining both to demography and to public policy) one must wonder why it is that 
Italy could not, would not, and did not face up to this drastically growing disparity. 
47 There was a boom in investment – which diminished notably for the economy as a whole – and the profits of 
war industries, especially the mechanical engineering industry  (Zamagni, 1993).  
 
27The effects of the First World War on geographical disparities were probably primarily 
of a deferred nature; that is, they laid the groundwork for a permanent reinforcement of 
industrial dualism. The widening of the geographical gaps, contemporary with or 
immediately following the conflict was instead not much more than that of the twenty years 
preceding it. It would become much more intense starting in the final years of the 1920s 
(Figure 10). It must be considered that the brief span of years between the end of the war and 
the age of “free market” fascism witnessed a relative stasis for large industry in the North 
involved in bailout operations and reconversion, a solid recovery for southern agriculture 
which continued nearly to end of the 1920s,
48 and the resumption of emigration. Manlio 
Rossi Doria describes this period as a positive one for the South:  
the marked increase in the price of agricultural goods, together with a new emigration 
flow and the higher value of emigrant remittances, besides an higher level of production, 
caused an increase in farmers’ savings, mostly used to buy land, so that they finally become 
land owners.
49 
But these interesting developments were halted and inverted in the second half of the 
1920s, first by changes in fascist economic policy and the great international depression, and 
then by the explosion of protectionism and restrictions on emigration. The years after 1925-
26 were certainly the worst period in the economic history of the South; the economic 
conditions of the South “deteriorated disastrously” (Davis, 1999). For the first time, the two 
components of the regional output gap, i.e. the variability internal to the Centre-North and 
the South on the one hand, the distance between the two on the other (Figure 11 and 
Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi, 2011) displayed different dynamics. While the first remained 
nearly unchanged, the second increased sharply; in this twenty-year period, that is, there 
occurred “a fracture of epochal proportions,” which shows a country “literally split in two,” 
(Brunetti, Felice and  Vecchi, 2011). 
Estimates by Svimez (2011), based on the reconstruction done by Daniele and 
Malanima (2007), indicate an overall growth of 12.3 per cent in GDP per inhabitant in the 
South (expressed in constant euros, year 2000) for the twenty-year period 1931-51, 
compared to growth of 38.4 per cent in the North. The difference is even more marked in the 
data presented by Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi (2011): the South grew by just 1.2 per cent, 
against 41.4 per cent for the Centre-North. According to this latter reconstruction, per capita 
output declined notably in Basilicata, Sicily, and Sardinia, a bit less in Puglia, while it 
increased by 60 per cent in Lombardy and even more, 70 per cent, in Veneto. In 1931 per 
                                                 
48 Southern agriculture modernized even further thanks to new farming methods (even grain farmers saw a 
strong increase in productivity), the spread of specialized crops (olives, grapes, almonds, citrus fruits) and the 
introduction of new crops (apricots, pears, peaches, cherries, and medlars), to the growth of sales on distant 
markets made possible in part by the introduction of refrigerated railway cars, and to a new willingness on the 
part of farmers to invest, even for considerably deferred returns, in confirmation of the fact that “in many 
entrepreneurial farming sectors in the South the willingness to risk was no less frequent or pronounced than 
elsewhere” (Bevilacqua, 1993). 
49 Manlio Rossi Doria, 1982, p.191. In the immediate post-war period, moreover, some of the public works 
projects proposed by Nitti in 1911-14 were implemented: reclamation projects in Sardinia and the artificial 
lakes on the Sila, even though the great “electro-irrigation” plan (Barone, 1986) – which could have brought 
about structural modifications in the conditions of ample parts of the South – was blocked by opposition from 
large southern landowners and then cancelled in 1925 (Zamagni 1993). There was also some attempt at 
industrialization in Calabria with the construction of the chemical plant in Crotone. 
 
28capita output in Veneto was 4 per cent below the southern average, but by 1951 it was 61 per 
cent higher.  
This striking retreat of relative output in the South is, in good measure, the fruit of 
policy choices made in the period that created difficulties for southern agriculture in the 
absence of any kind of industrial development, and in the presence of a rapidly growing 
population, owing to both natural causes and restrictions on emigration.
50 The autarky 
policy, “a wide range of policies aimed at making Italy self-sufficient and thus invulnerable 
in the event of war,” (Federico and Giannetti, 1999), especially harmed the South (Toniolo, 
1980) returning it to “initial conditions” in 1951 much worse in many respects than those of 
1861.
51 
Agriculture – The South remained an unequivocally agricultural area whose conditions 
were decidedly worse than in the preceding period. 
The crisis and the reduction in production level manifested themselves through a 
decrease in the price of agricultural goods, a migration stopping and higher unemployment 
rates. Between 1926 and 1941, in the South of Italy the level of agricultural production (at 
constant prices) was unchanged. But, at current prices (namely, at lower prices that take into 
account the impact of the crisis) there was a more than 40% decrease in the agricultural 
production values and even more pronounced was the reduction of farmers’ income, which 
was also due to lower wage rates. Considering that the primary sector accounted for more 
than 70% of total income in the South of Italy, the relevance of these figures become more 
clear.
52  
Fascism’s farm policy, with its preference for extensive cultivation, its ruralization 
policy and, finally, with its commercial treaties with Germany in the 1930s in a context of a 
drastic reduction in international trade, brought still greater damage to southern agriculture. 
Fascism “sacrificed the economic interests of the South and devastated its most advanced 
sectors” (Davis, 1999). The “Battle for Wheat”, in particular, sacrificed the interests of high-
value export crops; there was in increase in grain production and a drop in fruit: “an anti-
historical outcome which postponed for several decades the specialization of Italian 
agriculture” (Zamagni, 1993). Whereas in 1911 value added per worker in Sicily was 40 per 
                                                 
50 Infrastructure policies also contributed to the widening of the gaps. The “much acclaimed spending for public 
works was vastly reduced by 1932” (Castronovo, 1975). Initial construction of the national highway network 
was concentrated almost exclusively in the North, with the exception of the Naples-Pompeii; the plan outlined 
in 1934 by the State Road Agency to expand the highway network to all regions, including Calabria and Sicily, 
was delayed by the war in Ethiopia and then cancelled (D’Antone, 2011a). The railway network underwent a 
remarkable modernization, with lines being doubled and electrified, but this too touched the South only 
marginally (the Rome-Naples fast train line and electrification of the Naples-Foggia line), while in 1934 the 
Bologna-Florence fast train was inaugurated, reducing travel time from 5 hours to one and a half (Zamagni, 
1993).   
51 The South’s relative decline extended to other human development indicators (Figure4) and living 
conditions, probably owing to the scanty attention of the social policies of the time to the disadvantaged. Not 
coincidentally, the fascist era saw a strong redistribution of income toward the wealthier classes. Contrary to 
what happened in liberal Italy, the poorer half of the population got poorer and only the wealthiest families 
benefited; “the twenty years of fascism assumed the contours, therefore, of a historical period in which the 
taboo of poverty was accompanied by flagrantly regressive redistributive effects” (Amendola, Salsano and 
Vecchi, 2011). 
52 Manlio Rossi Doria, 1982, p.192. 
 
29cent higher than the Italian average, by 1951 it had shrunk to 5 per cent lower; the same was 
true for Sardinia (from +62 to -14 per cent), in Puglia (from +10 to -18), in Calabria (from -
17 to -38;, that is, in all those regions where there had been a robust development of quality 
farming.
53 Fascism’s commitment to land reclamation was its only positive policy for the 
South, thanks in part to the activity of Arrigo Serpieri and his 1928 legislation on “integral 
reclamation”. The reclamations, undertaken in part as a means of absorbing high 
unemployment, were major public works projects, including, beyond the largest and most 
famous ones that turned the Pontine marshes into the Pontine plain, smaller ones in the 
Tavoliere, Metaponto, Sibari, Lamezia, Rosario, and the plains around Catania, for an 
overall estimated total of 400,000 hectares (Bevilacqua, 1993). The disparity with the rest of 
the country, however, did not improve because only one quarter of the land area reclaimed 
between 1923 and 1949 was in the South (Zamagni, 1993). In his own post-war assessment 
of the reclamation programme, Serpieri declared that “available financial resources – already 
anything but ample at the start – gradually became even scarcer and more inadequate for a 
task that was much too broad in scope” (Cafiero, 1996). Yet again, wars (in Africa and 
Spain) diverted “means, interests, and will”. 
Industry – Italian industrial development in the fascist period “didn’t stop but took 
roads that were probably different from those that might have been expected” (Zamagni, 
1993). In the South it was extremely limited. 
Between 1911 and 1936 the number of workers in the manufacturing sector, as 
measured by the population census, went from 2.6 to 3.1 million in the Centre-North, while 
in the South it fell from 893 to 823 thousand (Svimez, 2011). When crafts and small 
business are excluded, the disparity is truly striking: the industrial census of 1937-39 found 
that 86 per cent of the approximately 28,000 manufacturing plants with at least 11 
employees were in the Centre-North (Svimez, 2011). 
Economic policy tended to crystallize the pre-existing structure of production and 
business, owing both to the distribution of public contracts
54 and to the promotion of 
agreements among producers, reinforcing their monopolistic power (Romeo, 1988, p.151).
55 
Fascism put into effect a policy to favour industrialization outside of the industrial triangle. 
In certain respects the policy resembled Nitti’s projects, but it involved only cities of the 
Centre-North.
56 
                                                 
53 The data here are calculated on the basis of Felice (2007, Table 3.3). 
54 In 1938 some 28 per cent of mechanical engineering production was constituted by government purchases 
(Zamagni, 1993). The war in Ethiopia also generated important public supply contracts for northern industry 
(Castronovo, 1975); the colonial occupation of Ethiopia opened up a new protected market, of a certain 
importance for Italian industry. For the South it was simply a limited source of employment: in 1936 more than 
100,000 southerners were serving in the colonial army (Castronovo, 1975). 
55 Industrial cartels were made legal in 1926 and obligatory in 1936; two years later there were 144 of them at 
national level (Federico and Giannetti, 1999). In 1933 a law was enacted authorizing the construction of new or 
expanded industrial plants (Castronovo, 1975).  
56 The most important project was Porto Marghera, promoted by Minister Giuseppe Volpi. The first plants were 
built as early as 1922 and by 1939 they employed some 15,000 workers. The other assisted industrial zones 
(with infrastructural works and tax relief, which became sites for advanced technology plants) were in Livorno, 
Massa, Ferrara, Bolzano, and Trieste (Petri, 1991). 
 
30The Banking Law of 1927 also favoured greater channelling of investments to the 
Centre-North (Castronovo, 1975). In Raffaele Mattioli’s reconstruction (cited in Zamagni, 
1993, p. 381): “most of the credit [. . .] was extended to a small number of companies, a 
hundred or so, which because of that aid were able to grow considerably, but which 
depended on it to the point of not being able to do without it; thus, the former physiological 
symbiosis was now transformed into a monstrous Siamese twinship”.  To this must be added 
the gigantic bailout operation of the banking and industrial system conducted by the 
Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI) (D’Antone, 2011), whose funding division 
intervened almost exclusively in the North, where most of the national industry was 
concentrated.
57 
Rearmament and the war made the situation even worse. War once again stimulated 
military production, especially steel and machinery, heavily concentrated in the North and 
for the most part publicly owned through IRI (Romeo, 1988). The war provoked moderate 
damage to Italian industrial plants, but the course of events ensured that the brunt was borne 
by the already modest industry of the South, particularly in Campania. According to the 
industrial census conducted by the Allied Command, over 35 per cent of the 1939 value of 
plants in the South had been destroyed by 1944; in Naples the damage amounted to 67 per 
cent (Svimez, 2011). 
Finally, by favouring imports of raw materials and the resumption of industrial 
production in the North, reconstruction policy choices widened, yet again, the regional 
development disparities: purchases of goods financed by the Marshall Plan were used to 
“renovate industrial facilities to favour economies of scale” (Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi, 
2011). Not coincidentally, 84.3 per cent of the financial facilities granted to Italian industry 
from the end of the war to 1951 were directed to companies in the Centre-North (Svimez, 
2011). Some 90 per cent of American funding in 1946-52 was used for investments that 
allowed Italian industry to undertake a massive renovation of plant and equipment, which 
took concrete form in a doubling of the horsepower installed in 1951 compared to 1937/39 
(Zamagni, 1993). 
According to Pasquale Saraceno (1977), this effect was already foreseeable at the time 
of the earliest policy choices in 1945; with regard to possible development in the South, “I 
don’t believe that such a profound innovation of our concept of economic development 
could have been reasonably expected at the time. Aside from our insuperable national, and 
especially Lombard-Venetian, insensitivity to the Southern question, there were other 
imposing problems then which could not be put off”: the generalized impoverishment of the 
country (with output in 1945 at half of its pre-war level), and industrial unemployment, 
especially in the defence industry. In the immediate post-war period and during the work of 
the Constituent Assembly, discussion of the problems and prospects of the South was very 
modest (Barucci, 1978).  
                                                 
57 IRI took over the share holdings of Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano, and Banco di Roma. In 1934 three 
quarters of Italian industry and agriculture was held by the State. IRI controlled 100 per cent of the defence-
related steel industry, artillery production, and coal mining, 90 percent of shipbuilding works, 80 per cent of 
maritime shipping companies and locomotive producers, 40 per cent of steel, 30 per cent of electric power, 
almost all telephone service, various mechanical engineering firms, plus, naturally, the three banks (Zamagni, 
1993). At the end of the war, IRI controlled 216 companies with an overall total of 135,000 employees (Barca 
and Trento, 1997).  
 
31So, in 1951, the southern economy was in disastrous condition. According to the recent 
reconstruction by Svimez, southern industry’s share of value added amounted to just over 11 
per cent of the national total, well under half of its share in 1911 as calculated by Fenoaltea 
(26 per cent). For every thousand inhabitants the South had just 43 full-time equivalent 
workers, compared to 77 for the North-East and 171 for the North-West. Labour productivity 
at current prices was almost 40 points lower than the Italian average, and 54 points lower 
than in the North-West. The data on industrial corporations also show a marked widening of 
the disparities: in 1916 southern corporations had accounted for 14 per cent of the national 
total; in 1951 they accounted for less than 8 per cent. 
In the immediate post-war period, the “strong points” of southern industry, to the 
extent they appear on the map of industrial clusters, were reduced to a minimum (less than 3 
per cent of the national total in terms of employees; Table10, last column) and almost 
entirely concentrated in the food processing sector, still relatively unexposed to competition. 
Compared to 1911, the collapse is evident: in 40 years all of the clusters in mechanical 
engineering, chemicals, clothing and shoes had disappeared (Tables 9 and 10). The clusters’ 
share of total manufacturing employment in the South had dropped from 17 per cent to 5; the 
difference, not only compared to the still-dominant North-West, but even with respect to the 
North-East and Centre, is striking (Figure 13). 
Population – Demographic dynamics, both migratory and natural, are also 
fundamental to an understanding of period trends. As is well known, the period between the 
two wars was characterized by much smaller international population flows than at the turn 
of the century. Significant restrictions on immigration were introduced, starting with the 
United States from 1920 on. In the five-year period 1920-24, the number of expatriations 
was 1.1 per cent of the total population in the South and 0.9 per cent in the Centre-North, 
both figures half of what they were in 1910-14 (Svimez, 2011, p.129). In 1925-29 the figures 
continued to shrink, especially in the South, down to 0.5 per cent. In the 1930s, international 
migratory flows were substantially reduced to zero. 
Internal migration remained modest: primarily population flows from Veneto, Puglia, 
and Sicily to the North-West. This occurred despite fascism’s vigorous efforts to block 
population shifts to the cities and to the more heavily industrialized areas. After 1931 change 
of residence required specific authorization; in 1939 internal migration was outlawed (Carey 
and Carey, 1955). 
At the same time, the regional divergence in natural demographic dynamics was 
accentuated. In the three decades from 1880-82 to 1910-12, Italy as whole experienced a 
decline in fertility of just 11 points; in the following quarter century (from 1910-12 to 1935-
37) this moderate decline turned into a  steep drop: the fertility rate lost nearly 50 points, 
from 154 to 105. But the decline was much more pronounced in the Centre-North, where it 
dropped by 61 points, from 149 to 88, while the South it declined by only 25 points, from 
163 to 138. In 1910-12, Veneto and Puglia shared the same fertility rate (181); twenty-five 
years later Veneto’s rate was 111 and Puglia’s was 150 (Svimez, 1954). For the first time in 
the country’s history, the population dynamic (including migratory flows) contributed to a 
widening of the regional disparities in per capita output (Table 11). 
 
323.  The economic miracle and convergence: 1951-1973 
3.1 What  happened 
For decades beginning in 1951 the South underwent a period of exceptional growth. It 
came at the same time as the fastest overall growth in Italian economic history but was even 
faster. For the first – and last – time since national unification, the output gap between South 
and North was reduced significantly and over a protracted period. (Figure 2). All the 
southern regions took part, if to differing extent (Figure 5). 
From 1951 to 1971 per capita GDP in the South rose at an average annual rate of 5.77 
per cent, one of the best performances in the entire world (Figure 3). The South was 
outperformed significantly only by Japan, and slightly by Greece and Spain. Setting average 
income in the United States, at purchasing power parity, equal to 100, during these two 
decades the Italian South rose from 22.3 to 46.6, leaving the countries of Eastern Europe 
well behind and overtaking those of the Mediterranean except Spain (Felice, 2007). 
The gap in per capita output with the rest of Italy was narrowed from 53 percentage 
points in 1951 to 44 in 1961 and 33 in 1971.
58 Essentially, the South gained a percentage 
point of per capita GDP a year, at a time when Italian GDP was growing at historically 
unequalled rates.  
It should be said that during these same years practically all the countries of Europe 
experienced a reduction in geographical disparities. In fact, virtually all the main cases of 
postwar interregional convergence occurred from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. Between 1955 
and 1977 the portion of the population living in regions whose per capita output was at least 
15 per cent below the national average was cut in half in France, Spain and Greece, nearly 
eliminated in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and West Germany (Iuzzolino, 2009). 
The performance of the individual regions is also worth tracing. It led to a reduction of 
the internal variability within the macro-areas that was nearly on a par with the convergence 
between them (Figure 11). All the regions of the North-West saw a reduction in their output 
advantage over the national average, but the extent varied considerably, from 20 or more 
points in Piedmont and Lombardy to as much as 45 in Liguria, which came down from 162 
to 117 per cent of the average. In the Centre and North-East, Emilia and Tuscany made slight 
gains; Veneto was steady at about the national average, as was Lazio (at 109 per cent). 
Marche gained from 85 to 93 per cent. The smallest southern regions gained more than 20 
percentage points against the nationwide average, led by Basilicata, with a rise of 29 points, 
from 45 to 74, and Sardinia, from 62 to 91. Thus in 1971 Sardinia’s per capita GDP was 
higher than that of Umbria and almost equal to that of Marche. 
There was considerable improvement also in Puglia and Sicily, at nearly 20 points, but 
much less in Campania (just 7 points, from 68 to 75 per cent). Campania’s enormous 
advantage over the rest of the South was thus eliminated, never to return. By 1971 Campania 
lagged behind Abruzzo, after leading it by 35 percentage points in per capita GDP in 1911 
and still 13 in 1951. The only region still significantly behind was Calabria.  
                                                 
58 According to Daniele and Malanima. The data of Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi (2011) show a slightly less 
rapid but still extremely significant relative advance: from a gap of 51 points in 1951 to 46 in 1961 and 36 in 
1971. 
 
33For the South as a whole, 14 of the 20 points recouped can be ascribed to productivity 
gains, the remaining 6 to the relative shrinkage of population (Table 11). Both components, 
then, were factors in the convergence. On the one hand, there was powerful growth in per 
capita output, both sector-by-sector and through the sectoral composition effect due to the 
sharp relative decline of agriculture to the benefit of industry and services. The share of the 
economically active population engaged in agriculture was nearly halved from 58 per cent in 
1951 to 30 per cent in 1971, while industry’s share doubled from 17 to 35 per cent. At the 
same time, mass national and international emigration produced a structural moderation of 
the aberrant relation at the end of the war between the southern population and available 
resources. The region’s average negative domestic migratory balance exceeded 6 per cent, 
driving the different in per capita output down by nearly 7 points (Table 11). 
Productivity trends were better than in the North in individual sectors as well. 
Although the effect of the agrarian reform was “far below expectations” (Rossi Doria, 1957), 
southern farm productivity rose from 79 per cent of the national average in 1951 to 91 per 
cent in 1971 (Felice, 2007). Thanks to heavy public and private investment, hence the very 
substantial expansion of reclaimed and irrigated land, agricultural value added gained 2.8 per 
cent per year even though farm employment was nearly halved (Siracusano, Tresoldi and 
Zen, 1986). 
Industrial productivity also rose sharply, from 76.4 to 99.1 of that of the Centre-North 
(Figure 18),
59 thanks in part to the installation of a good many large plants, driven by public 
subsidies or the impetus imparted by public industry. Direct employment in state-owned 
corporations in the South rose from 40,000 in 1960 to 150,000 in 1975 (Bodo and Sestito, 
1991). The census of southern industrial plants with at least 20 workers in 1977 (CESAN, 
1978) shows the full importance of non-southern industrial groups: 57 per cent of 
manufacturing employees were working at nearly a thousand plants that were either 
government-, northern- or foreign-owned (Table 12). Two-thirds of these plants had been 
built since 1961 and half were in “heavy” industry (petrochemicals, basic metals, mechanical 
engineering, transport equipment). A most interesting reading is that the modernization of 
southern industry was functional to the overall progress of Italian manufacturing: “In the 
name of regional equalization, Italy created the basic industry that was essential to the 
successes of the Italian export industries that were at the forefront of the ‘economic miracle’: 
textiles, engineering, motor vehicles” (Giannola, 2010). 
Also going by gauges other than GDP or productivity, southern development was 
equally impressive. Per capita consumption tripled in real terms, the number of cars on the 
roads rose from 125,000 to 3.3 million, the number of telephones from 110,000 to 2.2 
million. Half the region’s housing stock was built during those years, and 54,000 kilometers 
of new roads (Cafiero, 1976). The literacy rate gained 12 percentage points, practically 
closing the gap with the rest of the country. Convergence was also achieved for life 
expectancy at birth, which was more than 71 years in both parts of Italy, practically twice as 
long as 90 years earlier (Vecchi, 2011). 
3.2  What failed to happen 
                                                 
59 The gain was accompanied by rising wages. Per capita employee earnings in southern manufacturing rose 
from 57.2 per cent of northern earnings in 1951 to 76.4 per cent in 1971. This resulted in a modest loss of 
competitiveness: manufacturing unit labour costs rose from 75 to 77 per cent.  
 
34Not everything was positive, however. The many, profound changes to the social and 
economic structure of the South failed to include at least one of crucial importance: the local 
deepening of manufacturing product chains, the expansion of the capacity to supply goods to 
serve exploding consumer demand, which occurred in other parts of the country in those 
decades. The expansion of the southern industrial base proved insufficient in number of 
enterprises and ill-adapted in composition to the radical changes in the competitive 
environment that began to take place in the 1970s. 
This inadequacy was clearly perceived by Luigi Einaudi, who in 1960 warned against 
the optimistic forecasts of southern development led by public policy: 
We should not think that, thanks to the State or private citizens, the number of business 
activities able to generate higher income level would increase quickly. The State can 
contribute…but the economic development will be mostly driven by the growth of single 
firms that will favour the creation and proliferation of similar enterprises…; but it is a slow 
process.
60 
This was the primary reason why from the very outset the southern economy’s 
capacity to absorb the manpower shed by agriculture was insufficient to maintain 
equilibrium in the labour market. The differential in unemployment rates, which had been 
practically eliminated by the mid-1960s, widened again to nearly 3 percentage points in 
1971 (Figure 14). Census data show that the number of workers in plants located in the 
South and active in industry or services (excluding government) increased by 51 per cent in 
twenty years (30 per cent in manufacturing; Svimez, 2011), while in the Centre and North it 
rose by 78 per cent (and 56 per cent in manufacturing). For the South, this expansion was not 
enough to provide jobs for the exodus from farming; in the North – where the exodus had 
begun decades earlier – it was more than enough. And southern industry actually regressed 
from 210,000 to 174,000 plants, while the rest of Italy recorded expansion from 422,000 to 
456,000. 
Brusco and Paba (1997, p. 271) observe: “The South lost a large number of small 
enterprises that may have achieved regional size but could not withstand the offensive from 
the enterprises of the North.” Our reconstructed map of Italian industrial clusters (Table 13) 
confirms their relative unimportance in the South, which was the only part of the country to 
undergo a decline in the number of highly specialized industrial areas in the 1950s and 
1960s.
61 
The regions of the Centre and North-East showed a completely different pattern. There 
the fabric of craft and micro enterprises present at the end of the war evolved progressively. 
With the growth of domestic demand, it strengthened and thus, progressively, gave rise to 
better structured firms and to the development of existing clusters (as in Tuscany and 
Veneto) or the creation of new industrial districts, as in Marche, a region where economic 
geography had detected no such clusters previously (Brusco and Paba, 1997). This was the 
crucial phenomenon of a process of industrialization rightly termed “without ruptures” (Fuà 
                                                 
60 Taken from an article for Corriere della Sera entitled “Mezzogiorno e tempi lunghi” that Einaudi wrote just 
days before his death; cited in Barucci, P. (2003), p. 90. 
61 On the possible crowding-out of southern industry by the drop in transport costs and more competitive 
central and northern products, see Faini (1983). 
 
35and Zacchia, 1984), which was based in part on foundations different from those of the 
North-West and which would sustain the economy for decades. 
Why did this happen? Why did the growth paths of small firms and systems of small 
firms diverge so sharply between Centre/North-East and South? Essential though the 
question is to Italian economic history, it is not easy to find one definitive answer. A number 
of factors, in all likelihood, combined to determine the outcome. 
History certainly counts. As we have seen, in 1951 the distance between the two parts 
of Italy was already great both in terms of industrialization (Figures 12 and 13) and in terms 
of per capita income, hence in the initial volume of local demand, which fosters the 
competitive growth of local firms. 
Physical geography also counts, and human geography as shaped by infrastructural 
projects definitely counts. No internal southern market had ever existed, and certainly none 
did in the 1950s and 1960s. The geography of the South and the glaring lack of transport 
networks, with the consequent absence of a tradition of interregional trade within the South, 
meant that for small southern manufacturers the “internal market” was strictly local. The size 
of this local demand varied considerably: somewhat larger in Puglia or around Naples, 
where in fact the cases of endogenous business development were concentrated; tiny along 
the southern Apennines. This situation contrasted sharply with the state of the Po valley as 
far back as the nineteenth century, which had come within the reach of firms in central Italy, 
especially on the Adriatic coast. 
Smaller and poorer internal markets. The 1951 census found that just 13 per cent of 
non-farm firms in the South had “extra-municipal extension,” i.e. some premises outside the 
municipality of origin, compared with 39 per cent in the Centre and North. Of these, nearly 
30 per cent had “interregional extension,” i.e. premises outside their home region (Svimez, 
1961). These “interregional” firms were those best placed to exploit the unification of the 
national market and the growth of consumer spending. They employed more than 1.6 million 
workers in the Centre and North, including 600,000 in Lombardy and 500,000 in Lazio, but 
just 54,000 in the South, mostly in Campania (33,000). The much smaller and chiefly local 
southern firms were hampered by serious barriers to entry into larger, non-local markets and 
by lack of distribution networks (Barca, 1997). 
Probably social factors also played a role, in particular the organization of 
sharecropping and the coexistence of agricultural with craft activities, which are masterfully 
analysed by Bagnasco (1977), Fuà and Zacchia (1984), and the abundant literature on the 
“third Italy” and its virtuous industrialization processes. Certainly a significant factor was 
the enormous initial gap in schooling (recouped only subsequently) between South and 
Centre/North-East. In 1951 the literacy rate for the population aged 15 and older was 63 per 
cent in Calabria, 67 per cent in Basilicata, and 77 per cent in the best southern region, 
Abruzzo, against 84 per cent in Marche and 93 per cent in Veneto. 
To this, we must add the resumption of mass emigration in the 1950s. This involved 
not only the farm workers and the rural under-employed but also craftsmen, especially from 
the southern hinterland. And if resurgent emigration offered opportunities to southerners, at 
the same time it deprived the South of some of the best elements of its work force, potential 
entrepreneurs. It thus helped to cause the “destruction of the fabric of specific craft and 
 
36industrial skills that had been rooted in the South before the war and could have fostered 
development” (Brusco and Paba, 1997, p. 283). 
3.3  The role of policy 
The tumultuous process of convergence in the first two post-war decades was 
sustained and in many respects led by a set of public policy programmes that created the 
conditions for economic growth in the South.
62 First of all, a set of programmes centring on 
the (Southern Italy Development Fund) (“Cassa per il Mezzogiorno”) was devised. In its 
first decade the Fund focused on agricultural infrastructure, water systems, government 
structure. In the 1960s it concentrated on the direct promotion of industrialization. This 
action was flanked by national programmes to strengthen health, welfare and education 
which, though not addressed directly to the backward regions, had greater impact in the 
South both in terms of welfare and in terms of resource transfers in proportion to local GDP. 
They thus fostered partial structural equalization, given Italy’s historically most uneven 
endowments in health and education facilities, as is shown by the convergence of the South’s 
human development indicators with those of the rest of the country (Figure 4). All of this 
produced a widespread perception of the positive presence of the national government in the 
South, perhaps for the first time since Italian unification. 
The Southern Italy Development Fund is one of Italy’s great, extraordinary economic 
institutions, on a par with IRI. And it was the men of IRI, who had led the defence and 
support of the industrial apparatus of northern Italy in the 1930s, who now aimed to bring 
industrial development to the South (D’Antone, 1997). The idea of a special agency for the 
industrialization of the South was the brainchild of the southern industrial development 
association (Associazione per lo sviluppo dell’industria nel Mezzogiorno – Svimez), 
founded in 1947, and was elaborated on with the aid of Domenico Menichella, who was 
Governor of the Bank of Italy and a director of Svimez, and the experts of the Bank 
(Barucci, 1978). The project was sustained by the United States, in part because it resembled 
Roosevelt’s New Deal agencies and in part because it was considered to be a useful 
instrument for employing the funds of the World Bank. The Fund arose as a public law 
agency, independent from the government, charged with a specific, fixed-term programme. 
Some features of the Fund were totally new in political and legal terms. It formed part of the 
general concept of the “mixed economy” in which government not only facilitates and 
encourages private enterprise but, if this proves insufficient for development, can take its 
place. 
                                                 
62 The reference here is not to land reform and the expropriation of large landed estates (the “Sila” law for 
Calabria in 1950, the partial reform law in October and a similar one for Sicily in December, all the same year). 
These measures had the essentially social aim of easing the tensions of the early post-war years, in which land-
starved peasants and farm labourers occupied the land or staged violent uprisings, as in Puglia. The reform 
gave land to 113,000 peasant households; 767,000 hectares of farmland went to land reform agencies, which 
assigned 89 per cent of it to the peasants (La Marca, 1973). The reform, together with land reclamation 
projects, not only improved resources and allowed for stepped-up farming but permanently changed the 
contractual relations governing land ownership and use, unchaining suppressed energy and rapidly improving 
civil, social and economic conditions.  
 
37The Southern Italy Development Fund was instituted by Law 646/1950.
63 Its action 
was governed by two main criteria: its spending was additional (“extraordinary”) to ordinary 
government operations; and it was to be conducted under a multiyear programme (entrusted 
to a special Ministerial Committee for the South), structured as a series of one-year plans. 
The use of exceptional instruments carried major implications for institutional development 
in the South. In the face of the shortcomings of the central government in project design and 
integrated planning, there was no rewriting of the rules for the ordinary operation of markets 
and government; instead, a new body was created, to which financial and intellectual 
resources were channeled. The Fund had no intention of regulating markets, especially the 
capital market; it operated in their stead. The role played by ordinary government institutions 
was modest in the extreme. But its success depended on the existence of special 
requirements, in particular “the sense of mission of the civil servants heading public 
agencies”. But no mechanism for reproducing these features was envisaged, nor was the 
relationship between political control and management regulated, so that when the political 
and idealistic climate of the nation changed, the structure lost independence and 
effectiveness (Barca, 1997). 
The Fund’s extraordinary measures for the South, theoretically additional to ordinary 
action, came in two phases, corresponding to two laws establishing their legal basis. The first 
was bound up with the law instituting the Fund, which provided for a ten-year investment of 
over 1.2 trillion lire for land reclamation, aqueducts, hydroelectric projects, roads, railways 
and infrastructure in general, which were considered essential to the industrial development 
of the area. These were complicated public investments with deferred returns, not only 
because they involved infrastructure but because in many cases they were complexes of 
works whose economic return depended on the completion of every single part. The results 
were appreciable; in the opinion of some scholars, explosive (D’Antone, 1997). By the end 
of the 1950s the public works and infrastructure connected with the Marshall Plan and the 
first programme of the Fund, within the framework of trade liberalization, had lifted all the 
regions of Italy to unimagined heights of income and consumption. Although the direct 
employment impact of the Fund’s works was limited, averaging 140,000 jobs a year (Carey 
and Carey, 1955), the effect on investment was substantial. The investment rate rose 
appreciably, from 23.7 per cent of GDP in 1951 to 31.9 per cent in 1955, while southern 
investment rose from 35.5 to 43.7 per cent of investment in the rest of Italy. Looking only at 
industry excluding construction, the South’s relative gain was from 16.6 to 22.1 per cent. 
The second phase for the Fund was ushered in by the passage of Law 634/1957, which 
was based on the idea that the construction of the prerequisites for growth had been 
completed, that the Fund had worked well to this end but that it was now necessary to 
proceed with industrialization proper. The new policy, then, was one of more determined 
industrialization to flank the traditional agricultural and infrastructural projects. A more 
substantial subsidy programme was put in place; infrastructural projects were concentrated 
in the most propitious areas for industry (development poles). This was accompanied by a 
more massive presence on the part of the state-owned corporations, which were required to 
                                                 
63 In addition to the regions of the South, its purview also covered the Isle of Elba in Tuscany, the provinces of 
Latina and Frosinone in Lazio, the municipality of Cittaducale and surrounding towns in Lazio, and the Tronto 
land reclamation district. 
 
38locate at least 60 per cent of new investment and not less than 40 per cent of total investment 
in the South. 
The new law accompanied the extensive development of Italian industry during the 
miracle years. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the political impetus for industrialization 
was especially strong. A highly significant instance was the political decision to locate 
Italy’s fourth steelworks in the South, at Taranto (Romeo, 1988). The South’s share of total 
investment by state-owned corporations rose from 17 per cent in 1957 to 40 per cent in 1962. 
At the same time, however, support programmes were launched for disadvantaged areas 
outside the South, with “crowding-out” effects that were probably worse than expected. The 
inclusion of parts of Lazio within the jurisdiction of the Fund led to the creation of an 
industrial pole in Pomezia, practically on the outskirts of Rome; and special legislation 
(Laws 647/1950 and 635/1957) offered tax subsidies and exemptions for selected areas in 
the Centre and North. Another legislative change was enacted with Law 717/1965, which 
extended the incentives, albeit with some limits, to large industrial initiatives and broadened 
the sphere of application. 
The overall results of the Fund’s extraordinary intervention – valued at 6.6 trillion lire 
in 1970 (La Marca, 1973), to which one must add the funds appropriated by the regions of 
Sicily and Sardinia to additional projects – were of fundamental importance to the economy. 
In the aggregate: in 1971 the investment rate in the South was 37 per cent, nearly twice as 
high as the 20.7 per cent rate of the Centre and North. That same year investment in the 
South was 58 per cent of the amount invested in the rest of Italy, although regional GDP was 
only 36 per cent. The growth of industrial productivity was extremely rapid over the years, 
virtually closing the gap with respect to the North (from 76.4 per cent in 1951 to 99.1 per 
cent in 1971). 
This basically positive assessment of the Fund’s activity and of regional development 
policy in general, however, must not be allowed to conceal the feebleness of the stimulus 
that it provided for self-sustained growth. For one thing, as we shall see further on, the 
incentives for large plants went mainly to public and private monopolies, especially in the 
chemical and petrochemical industries, and – contrary to expectations – failed to forge any 
local links between the input and output sides or to foster local management capabilities, 
which remained in the North. There was some local formation and conservation of skills and 
human capital that would survive the eventual demise of these plants, but the positive results 
would come only in the long term (Bianchi, Masselli and Pellegrini, 2008). And secondly, 
the Fund acted mainly as domestic demand support for northern industry. The increase in 
internal demand translated more into imports than into local output of goods and tradable 
services, while it did stimulate construction and non-tradable services, especially personal 
services. The southern market became highly important to northern Italian industry, 
especially prior to the first export boom in connection with European integration. In 1959 the 
South took 70 per cent of the Centre and North’s net exports (Castronovo, 1975). Access to a 
growing domestic market enabled northern firms to achieve economies of scale (and skill) 
that proved to be a major factor for success on the international market (Castronovo, 2010), 
while southern firms were often reduced to a local dimension. 
These dependency effects are evident in the data on imports. Southern imports were 
high already in the 1950s, equivalent to nearly a quarter of regional GDP, indicating the 
presence of very substantial transfers from the rest of the country. The data as reconstructed 
 
39by Svimez show that net imports from the rest of Italy and the rest of the world came to 24.3 
per cent of southern GDP at current prices in 1951 and 38.1 per cent in 1963 before 
subsiding to 30 per cent in 1970. 
4.  End of the economic miracle and of convergence: 1974-1999 
The South’s economic convergence with the rest of Italy came to a halt in 1971. The 
ratio of the region’s per capita GDP to that of the rest of the country reached a level (two 
thirds, up from under half in 1951) that it would never again equal. Region by region, over 
the next forty years the gap with the North-West remained basically unchanged, but that with 
the North-East and the Centre widened, as those areas grew steadily faster than the national 
average. In purely quantitative terms the overall North-South gap did not change greatly over 
these decades, but the situation within the South, in terms of provinces, grew more uniform; 
consequently there was a gradual widening of the disparity between the “best” southern and 
the “worst” central and northern provinces. But there was a major structural modification: 
the weight of the various components of the GDP gap changed, with a more and more 
important role being played by employment rates. This was when the “Southern question” – 
since the 1950s no longer an agrarian question – became the great question of lack of jobs.
64 
Geographical polarization. The first of these processes is described by the pattern over 
time in the distribution (relative to the Italian average) of per capita output in the 95 
provinces into which Italy was divided in 1951. Figure 15 shows that in that year output was 
basically unimodal; that is, that the provinces both of the South and of the rest of the country 
were concentrated near the median. The result was substantially uniform distribution by 
output levels with a higher frequency near the national mean. In the decades that followed 
the distribution tended to spread but remained basically unimodal. In 1971 there was still a 
large group of provinces near the median, with a significant southern presence (Taranto with 
per capita GDP of 103 per cent of the national average, Siracusa at 90 per cent, Matera at 89 
per cent, Cagliari at 88 per cent and Pescara at 85 per cent). 
By 1981, the distribution had changed, becoming clearly bimodal: two clearly 
separated sets of provinces with different levels of per capita GDP and a sharply reduced 
number of provinces intermediate between the two modes. Practically all the southern 
provinces were in the poorer group; none were above the national average. The highest ratio 
was in L’Aquila (94 percent), followed by Teramo (89 per cent), Siracusa (87 per cent) and 
Taranto (80 per cent). This split was not overcome in the years that followed but became a 
characteristic of the per capita output distribution in Italy (Figure 16), which remains 
exceptional by international standards.
65 
                                                 
64 Thirty years ago Augusto Graziani wrote: “There is a blatant contradiction within the southern economy 
between the mass of investment and the volume of jobs created. Whereas … in a number of respects the 
southern economy is growing rapidly, employment remains depressed. As some have described the South as 
undergoing industrialization without development, so we can also speak of development without jobs” 
(Graziani and Pugliese, 1979, p. 17). Analogous considerations, combined with an analysis of the linkage 
between the lack of employment growth and the distorting effect of government intervention, can be found in 
Giannola and Del Monte (1978, chapter VIII; 1997, chapter 7) and Siracusano and Tresoldi (1990). 
65 In 2005, of the underdeveloped regions of Europe (those with per capita GDP less than 85 per cent of the 
national average), a significant portion of the population (18.1 per cent) lives in provinces that are above that 
threshold. But his phenomenon is absent in Italy, where the most highly developed province within the 
underdeveloped regions had per capita GDP of 82.4 per cent of the national average in 2005 (Iuzzolino, 2009). 
 
40This analysis shows which provinces were “winners” and which were “losers” 
following the shocks of the 1980s and the subsequent industrial restructuring. In the Centre 
and North the relative loss of income was concentrated in the provinces with large 
enterprises, including service enterprises (Turin, whose relative output fell by 18 percentage 
points; Milan, which lost 16; and Rome, 13) or industries in crisis (all of Liguria: Genoa 
down by 23 points, Imperia by 24, La Spezia by 16, Savona by 18; or the province of 
Grosseto, down by 13 points, Livorno down by 8, Terni by 7). By contrast, there was rapid 
growth in a good many provinces characterized by clusters of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Rovigo up 28 points, Forlì up 29, Modena up 25, Reggio Emilia up 21, Macerata 
up 30). From 1971 to 1981, 46 of the 61 provinces of the Centre and North registered a rise 
in relative per capita output, while only a quarter recorded a decline. 
Meanwhile, in the South nearly half the provinces showed a decline in relative per 
capita output.
66 Overall, the province-by-province pattern is closely correlated with the 
changing local division of industrial labour in response to the upheavals in the competitive 
scenario. Production was transformed by corporate outsourcing, an increase in the incidence 
of service activities, downsizing and the strengthening of local enterprise clusters. 
These processes were not uniform throughout Italy but were diversified according to 
the initial sectoral and size composition of firms in the different areas. Thus the locational 
distribution was transformed with a shift of Italian industry from west to east, and to some 
extent to the South-East. The geographical structure of the major, typical Italian-made 
products was organized along major axes, from Milan towards Friuli, from Milan to central 
Tuscany, from Milan along the Adriatic, reaching Abruzzo and then, if to a lesser extent, 
Molise and Puglia (Viesti, 1995). The other regions of the South were left out of this 
process. 
The employment question and the industrial question. The North-South gap in per 
capita output increased from 33 per cent in 1971 to 40 per cent in 1991. Most of the 
widening (55 per cent) was due to the South’s relative productivity loss, the rest to its 
relative increase in population, which reflected not only a higher birth rate but also a sharp 
reduction in migration to the North (the net migratory balance was halved during the 1980s 
compared with the 1970s). This was accompanied by a rise in the unemployment rate; on a 
comparable basis the rate doubled from 8.3 per cent in 1979 to 15.8 per cent in 1989, while 
that in the Centre and North rose by just 1 point, from 5.8 to 6.9 per cent (Svimez, 2011). 
Given the rapid expansion of service employment during these years,
67 this poor capacity for 
creating jobs once more highlighted “industrial backwardness” as a key factor in the 
Southern question. 
                                                 
66 Sharp losses were registered in Taranto (down 11 points), Naples (11 points) and Cagliari (15 points). All the 
provinces of Sardinia also lost ground (Sassari was down by 9 points), as did those of Sicily (Enna was down 
by 19 points) except Agrigento and Catania (both up by 4 points). Abruzzo made substantial gains (L’Aquila 
up 19 points, Teramo up 18), as did Molise (Isernia up 19, Campobasso up 11), and the province of Avellino 
(up 12). 
67 During these decades, the service sector (public and private) was a sort of “sponge” sopping up a part of the 
excess labour supply. It gained much greater importance in the economy and the society – and the politics – of 
the South. At the turn of the 1980s public employees accounted for nearly 17 per cent of total employment in 
the South, 3 percentage points more than in the rest of the country (Bodo and Sestito, 1991).  
 
41The end of convergence was associated with the threefold wage, oil and budget shock 
of the 1970s (Ciocca, 2007). The effects were aggravated by major institutional changes that 
made it harder to achieve labour market balance or fiscal balance (with the creation of new 
levels of local government). Many of the explanations why southern per capita GDP ceased 
to grow faster than the average turn on the sometimes geographically asymmetrical impact 
of these problems and the sharp break they caused with the old “idea” behind southern 
development policy. These explanations can be summarized as follows: 
 labour market rigidities the prevented the South from overcoming the impact of the 
shocks to factor prices; 
 the emergence of a competitive deficit in connection with the structure of the shocks, 
which had more severe repercussions on the South than the rest of the country; 
 the termination (or substantial insufficiency) of public investment support 
programmes; 
 the crisis of the development programmes of the previous two decades, which partly 
as a result of institutional changes proved insufficient to trigger self-sustained growth. 
Convergence and the labour market. The reduction of domestic migration and the rise 
in the unemployment rate suggested that the difficulty of convergence might be connected 
with the malfunctioning of the labour market. In effect, the new labour market rules – the 
abolition of official regional wage differentials in 1969 and the Labour Rights Act of 1970 – 
reduced the flexibility of demand and supply, producing a “spatial rigidity of wages” (Mauro 
and Pigliaru, 2011) that was certainly detrimental to growth. However, the rise in southern 
relative to northern wages cannot be traced directly to the wage shocks of the 1970s but had 
begun in the previous decade (Figure 17). 
Excluding the effects of the increasing incidence of service activities (which greatly 
complicates the territorial breakdown of income and productivity trends) and concentrating 
on industry alone, it is clear that the trend in southern competitiveness with the rest of the 
country depends primarily on productivity (Figure 18). Value added per worker reached 99 
per cent of that in the rest of Italy in 1971 but then slipped to 86 per cent in 1991. Relative 
wages, equal to 60 per cent in 1961, rose to 76 per cent in 1971 and 81 per cent in 1981. As a 
result unit labour costs jumped by 15 points in a decade, from 77 per cent of those in the 
Centre and North in 1971 to 92 per cent in 1981. In just ten years the loss of 
competitiveness, dominated by the relative decline in productivity, had a severe impact on 
the South’s ability to sustain convergence. 
The loss of manufacturing competitiveness. This brings us to the second of the 
explanations set out above. In part, the decline in relative productivity in manufacturing in 
the South was due to the differential geographical impact of the energy and wage shocks. 
First of all, the world crisis created severe problems for the more energy-intensive segments 
of industry in Italy and throughout Europe – petrochemicals, oil refining, steel. Steel and 
man-made fibres, in fact, were the subject of planned action for Community-wide reduction 
of capacity – a sensational departure from the policies of protecting and fostering 
competition laid down in the Treaty of Rome (the Davignon Plan, 1977). 
Second, industrial relations, beginning with the “hot autumn” of 1969 (Rossi, 1998) 
were a major contributory factor in productive decentralization. Some major corporations 
 
42diminished the degree of vertical integration, increasingly outsourcing production phases to 
smaller firms with significant advantages in terms of labour costs (Brusco and Paba, 1997, p. 
307, estimate the advantage at 30 per cent) and flexibility in organization, the stages and 
processes of production. Other large firms cut staff or closed down altogether; the workers 
so expelled in some cases formed new businesses engaged in similar productive activity. 
“Thousands of lathe operators and milling machinists fired by the large firms started up 
work as suppliers for those same firms, often using identical machinery” (Brusco and Paba, 
1997, p. 324).  
Unfortunately, the industry of the South, largely the offspring of the second phase of 
extraordinary development policy, had a series of characteristics that could only accentuate 
these shocks. It consisted largely of basic industry, highly capital-intensive and often energy-
intensive; it was dominated by large, vertically integrated plants with little capacity to 
“induce” new business formation outside; it was marked by the overwhelming presence of 
state-owned corporations and a relative handful of private industrial corporations; and it was 
oriented almost exclusively to the domestic market. 
The measures for the direct industrialization of the South, often analysed in the 
literature, relied principally on incentives to attract capital. As Fenoaltea (2007), among 
others, notes, at the time it was believed that “in a world of fixed coefficients à la Leontieff” 
unemployment depended only on a relative shortage of capital. These incentives were thus 
particularly costly. But the mobile resources that arrived in the form of capital did not 
encounter a corresponding endowment of fixed resources in the form of infrastructure and 
human capital with which to interact (Felice, 2007). The incentives were structured so as to 
attract highly capital-intensive activities with a relatively low input of labour: in some, it 
drew in such speculative northern companies as Nino Rovell’s SIR and the Ursini family’s 
Liquichimica (Barca and Trento, 1997).
68 
In short, the shocks threw large industry into severe crisis while facilitating the 
activities of small and medium-sized enterprises. The effects on the South were devastating. 
The expansion of the steel industry’s capacity came to a halt with the cancellation of the 
plans for the nation’s fifth plant in Gioia Tauro, for which major works had already been 
completed. The steelworks of Taranto and Bagnoli in Naples (like the steel industry in 
Liguria) encountered a period of severe economic difficulty, as did the many basic chemical 
plants established in the South in the previous years (mainly in Sardinia, but also in other 
regions). 
The decentralization of production could not make these losses good. Decentralization 
is practicable only for modular or assembled products (clothing, engineering products and 
the like), not for continuous-cycle industry; and naturally only where large enterprises of the 
same type are already located. Outsourced work phases tend to be concentrated relatively 
nearby the original plants, as the potentially greater production savings in distant regions 
(such as the South) are more than offset by heightened coordination and transport costs. 
These developments further boosted the industrialization in the Centre and North-East, in 
                                                 
68 The majority of the economists who analysed Italian economic geography at the time were not optimistic; see 
Giannola and Del Monte (1978), for instance, or Graziani and Pugliese (1979). The recouping of per capita 
GDP was seen as a short-term effect of policies that were short-sighted and shot through with factors of 
distortion that generated immediate gains in output rather than laying the basis for the growth of employment in 
the long run. 
 
43particular Veneto, Emilia, Tuscany and Marche. They created problems for the large firms in 
the old industrial triangle, especially Liguria and Piedmont. They were considerably more 
limited in Abruzzo and Puglia. They triggered an explosion of entrepreneurship, reinforcing 
the locational advantages of the industrial districts. They were no help to the industry of the 
South. 
On the contrary, the major investments in the South produced only very slow, though 
not negligible, growth in secondary, follow-on economic activity. The southern industrial 
clusters did begin to increase in numbers, but their share of southern industry was less than 
half as much as in the economy nationwide (Table 13). Industrial establishments in the 
South, often enough directed by “second-rank managers whose tasks consisted mainly in 
mediation” with local politicians and social forces (Barca, 1997, p. 89), functioned more as 
mere production plants rather than true, independent industrial companies; many managerial 
functions were left to the parent company, thus only marginally creating the new managerial 
capabilities that in time could form independent enterprises. They were vertically integrated, 
with modest purchases of components and semi-finished products, so through this channel 
too they did little to induce the development of local business. Nor were their marketing 
policies designed to favour downstream development locally. The classic example is the 
Taranto steel works, which sold its output at the same price throughout Italy and thus did 
nothing to create a locational advantage (Barca and Trento, 1997, p. 218). 
This was a period of persistent, pronounced depreciation of the lira, which resulted in 
an appreciable gain in the price competitiveness of Italian products and a surge in exports. 
But these effects were asymmetrical. Sectorally it worked to the advantage of industries with 
greater price elasticity of demand, such as traditional consumer goods and in part mechanical 
engineering. Regionally it favoured those whose propensity to export was already high and 
those closer to the main outlet markets, chiefly within the European Community. These two 
sets largely coincided. Once again, the sectoral and geo-economic features penalized the 
southern industrial apparatus, whose products, given the nature of the region’s 
industrialization, were much more heavily oriented to the domestic market. In 1971 the 
exports of the southern regions as a group amounted to just 4.6 per cent of value added; this 
export propensity was lower still in Campania and Puglia (3.8 per cent) and higher only in 
Sicily (7.3 per cent). The national average, by comparison, was 12.4 per cent; that of the 
North-West was 19.8 per cent and that of Piedmont 23.7 per cent. The consequences for 
southern growth were significant. 
The insufficiency of public policy. This productivity-led competitiveness gap was 
accompanied by a differential in the profitability of investing in different parts of the 
country. Although the infrastructure development programmes – designed especially for the 
South, for the first time since national unification – had accomplished a great deal, they had 
only partly closed the yawning gap in public capital endowment. This raises the issue of how 
much the halt to convergence can be blamed on the reduction, or elimination, of investment 
policy measures (Barucci, Miotti and Pellegrini, 2011). Svimez data suggest that investment 
played an important part in the South’s post-war catch-up, and that its waning had a negative 
effect in the subsequent period. From 1951 to 1973 the investment rate was steadily higher 
in the South than in the Centre and North (Figure 19), with a maximum differential of 16 
percentage points in 1971. Over the next twenty years the flow of investment diminished, 
both in absolute terms and relative to that of the rest of Italy, partly in response to changes in 
 
44development policy. The investment rate in the South declined practically every year and 
plunged in 1992; by 1995 it was down to the same level as the early 1950s (19.5 per cent), 
just decimal points above the 18.6 per cent rate of the Centre and North. Southern capital 
accumulation got laboriously under way again in the late 1990s, and in 2009 the rate was 
22.5 per cent, just 2 points more than in the rest of Italy. So it is not hard to see that 
economic convergence followed the same pattern as the accumulation of capital, public and 
private. From 1951 to 1971 the investment surge sustained the growth of productivity, hence 
the catch-up in output. Afterwards, when the investment rate declined, the output gap was 
not narrowed. The ratio of net imports to GDP also closely tracked investment. The purchase 
of capital goods from the rest of the country was one of the chief mechanisms whereby the 
South incorporated technology into the production process and thus succeeded in keeping 
step with the technological trajectory of the Centre and North. 
According to Svimez, extraordinary expenditure for the South came to 0.7 per cent of 
GDP in the 1950s and 1960s, 0.9 per cent in the 1970s. It was reduced to 0.65 per cent in 
1981-86, then rising to 0.75 per cent through 1993 and 0.8 per cent thereafter. Thus the 
reduction in public intervention may have played a role in the end to convergence. But the 
question is broader, going to the nature of development policy in a backward region of a 
developed country as compared with the situation in an underdeveloped country proper. 
There are fewer instruments available, and reconciling the industrial development of the rich 
and poor areas is complicated. These problems were lucidly described by the American 
economist Hollis Chenery (1962). The problem of the South is its product specialization 
within the national economy. Being part of a large country gives the Italian South two major 
advantages: the possibility of larger or easier emigration and public resources to finance its 
sizeable payments deficit and levels of disposable income higher than regional output. At the 
same time, it anchors the backward region to an unfavourable product specialization. The 
elasticity of the South’s interregional exports to income was very low, so it benefited almost 
insignificantly from the powerful growth in demand. At the same time, however, the rise in 
income resulted in a surge of imports from other regions. Citing Pilloton (1960), Chenery 
showed that the multiplier effect of the investment in the South was felt mainly in the North. 
The improved environment in the South and the sharp rise in local consumption, then, 
failed to elicit a comparable development on the supply side. The marginal ratio of capital to 
output was very low, lower than in the rest of Italy and far lower than in the developing 
countries. This necessitated persistent, massive capital investment to generate any significant 
increment in production. According to Chenery the industrial development of the South of 
Italy could be achieved only within a long-term process of structural transformation of 
Italian output. It could not be left solely to investment measures but had to be part of a 
deliberate process whereby all national policy programmes would locate new economic 
activities in the backward parts of the country and so, with time, achieve a radical change in 
product specialization. The fundamental problems for growth in the South, hence for policies 
that could result in real regional convergence, were perfectly clear to people at the time. Was 
there such a national policy for convergence? The question is open. Ugo La Malfa’s 
“addendum” (Ministero del Bilancio, 1962, p. 28) noted that: 
Compared with the needs of the less developed areas of the country, the actions that 
have been implemented by the Government appear to be insufficient. Contradictions in the 
actions undertaken to favour the economic development of the South of Italy emerge also if 
 
45one looks at the monetary, fiscal, and credit policies adopted by the Government and to its 
attitude toward the self funding procedures; moreover, it never tried to affect the economic 
development characterizing the northern regions so as to favour a proper redistribution of 
resources from the richer to the poorer areas of the country. 
Law 717/1965, enacted under the centre-left government, was intended to make 
southern development a top national priority (Cafiero, 1996, p. 189). But “programming” 
had only very limited success. Throughout the subsequent period, with the partial exception 
of Ciampi’s “new planning,” it is hard to see any consistency between the major national 
development programmes (when and where there were any) and interregional convergence. 
The crisis of development policy and the limits of decentralization. In Italy, the 
national government is incapable of “serious programming and planning” (Romeo, 1988). In 
the 1960s the influence of southern advocacy on national policy was stronger than at any 
other time in Italian history. Even so, it met powerful resistance that impeded if it could not 
totally block the impetus to southern development. This affected not only the financial 
commitment to specific southern development programmes but also, as we shall see further 
on, the way in which national policies were used – or not used – to overcome the disparities 
between the two parts of the country.  
Further development of this line of analysis, underscoring the role of policy in slowing 
down convergence, bears on the creation of the regions (Mauro and Pigliaru, 2011). Until the 
1980s regional governments had no significant role in the implementation of local 
development policy, save for the special-statute regions of Valle D’Aosta, Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, Sicily and Sardinia. Starting in the mid-1970s a number of 
functions were devolved on the regions and a good number of officers seconded from the 
central government, resulting in increasing decentralization of territorial policies and 
programmes. Mauro and Pigliaru (2011) find that the process had a significantly negative 
differential effect for the South. The reason is that the decentralization of programmes makes 
them more vulnerable to local pressures and interest groups and, in a broader sense, more 
sensitive to the level and quality of social capital. As the South is poorer in social capital 
than the Centre and North, the consequences of this institutional repositioning were not 
positive. However, the empirical evidence on this point is not abundant. Paolo Sylos Labini 
(2001) held that organized crime is what explains the different development paths taken by 
Campania and Sicily on the one hand, Abruzzo and Molise on the other. Recent estimates 
(Pinotti, 2011) put the cost in terms of economic growth to Puglia and Basilicata of the 
spread of organized crime in those regions at around 15 percentage points. 
In conclusion, it is unlikely that the halt to convergence can be traced to a single factor. 
Certainly the shocks of the 1970s affected the South deeply, and at a time when adjustment 
mechanisms were less ready to moderate the geographical disparities. By contrast, in many 
parts of the “third Italy” decentralization and competitive devaluation of the lira lent impulse 
and provided market outlets to a myriad of small and medium-sized enterprises, an economic 
fabric that was not rooted in the South. This worked against the processes of convergence, 
while the programmes to sustain it began to falter, owing in part to the institutional reforms 
initiated during those years. Overall, the two parts of the country began to march parallel, 
neither closing nor widening the differential in income and output. The South’s progress 
relapsed once again into a kind of “passive modernization” (Cafagna, 1994). For that matter, 
the deceleration of development affected the entire national economy, raising additional 
 
46obstacles to growth. The South was unable to grow in an Italy that was not growing. But this 
is the story of the present. 
5.  The great stagnation: 1992-2009 
5.1  The money illusion of the last devaluations: a South out of step with the 
times 
Our present history begins with the dramatic crisis of the public finances and of the 
political system in general, which led to Italy’s last devaluations and the institution of the so-
called “second republic” and continued with the entire nation’s strenuous battle to qualify for 
the European single currency At the same time the global market was revolutionized by the 
emergence of China, India and other major countries whose growth rates were far higher 
than those of Europe or the other industrial economies. 
In 1992, this process came together with the dramatic collapse of the credibility of 
southern development policy. The Southern Italy Development Fund and its activities were 
definitively liquidated and its technical personnel, many of them highly skilled, were 
dispersed in a range of general government bodies. 
The resulting policy vacuum lasted through the mid-1990s, when Law 488/1992 for 
the funding of selected investment projects went operational. During these same years the 
European Union’s economic and social cohesion policy took shape with the Community 
Support Frameworks. In 1995 the first structural funds planning cycle began. The 
discretionary powers of the member states were considerably reduced; the criteria, calendar 
and procedure for the assignment of funds were established; progressively, power was 
shifted to sub-national governments – in Italy, the regions, which since the 1970s had been 
exercising some powers formerly assigned to the Southern Italy Development Fund. 
At first the structural fund programming had little effect, owing above all to the 
paralysis of  southern policy. The charging of southern employers’ social contributions to the 
central government budget was phased out under a 1994 agreement with the European 
Commission, and no offsetting policy measure was taken. The impact of restrictive fiscal 
policy was especially heavy for the economy of the South, which was more dependent on 
public resources. The dismantling of the state-owned corporations meant the collapse of 
another of the southern economy’s traditional buttresses. 
The devaluations fostered one last money illusion, shoring up the accounts of firms in 
the old industrial districts and permitting the rise in the South too of clusters of export-
oriented producers (Table 13). In the mid-’90s this process seemed to be advancing along 
lines similar to the successes of the “third Italy” (Bodo and Viesti, 1997). Unhappily for the 
South, the advantages of smallness and flexibility came too late with respect to the new 
international division of manufacturing and, with the turn of the century, the new foreign 
exchange framework. So after losing the locational advantages it had begun to acquire in the 
’60s and taking thirty years to create others, the Italian South found itself totally unsuited to 
the new competitive environment. 
From 1991 to 2006 manufacturing employment in the South in northern-owned 
companies (private, privatized or state-owned) was nearly halved (D’Aurizio and Ilardi, 
2011) both in absolute terms (from 162,000 to 83,000) and as a share of total southern 
 
47employment (from 19.5 to 11.5 per cent). The South’s share of national employment held 
steady at 17 per cent thanks to the greater stability of local enterprises. 
The data underscore the South’s difficulty in keeping up with even the slow growth of 
the rest of the country. Per capita output, equal to 59.6 per cent of that in the Centre and 
North in 1991, had inched up to 61.6 per cent in 2007, gaining a percentage point per 
decade. And even this minimal gain was due entirely to demographics: in terms of output 
alone the gap widened, albeit modestly, as southern GDP slipped from 33.8 to 32.7 per cent. 
The population of northern Italy grew relative to that of the South mainly because of 
immigration, both domestic (which produced an average ten-year population increase of 1.4 
per cent) and international (0.8 per cent). 
In the course of two decades national and international pressure constrained the South 
to engage in some economic restructuring, expelling the smallest and least productive firms 
from the market and recouping productivity in many sectors, such as wholesale and retail 
trade, with the beginnings of the growth in business size and the exploitation of economies 
of scale and scope already under way in the rest of the country. On the aggregate level the 
loss of employment was sharper than the loss of output, as the number of full-time 
equivalent workers in the South slipped from 40.2 to 36.6 per cent of that in the rest of the 
country. But the relative productivity gain (about 1 percentage point) was not sufficient to 
offset the rise in relative wages, whose index level, owing in part of sector and size effects, 
rose from 84.2 in 1991 to 89.9 in 2007. There was therefore a pronounced loss of 
competitiveness. Unit labour costs in the South, already 3.7 per cent higher than in the 
Centre and North in 1991, were nearly 9 points higher in 2007. In manufacturing alone the 
picture is similar, although the main factor in the loss here was output per worker, which fell 
from 86.4 to 81.5 per cent of that in the rest of Italy. So while relative employment levels 
remained comparable, unit labour costs in the South, which were 95 per cent of those in the 
rest of the country in 1995, were 1 percentage point higher in 2007 (Figure 18).  
These difficulties were accompanied by rising unemployment, from a rate of 16.2 per 
cent in 1991 to 19.6 per cent in 2009 (Figure 14). In the rest of the country, not only was the 
rate much lower but it worsened much more moderately, from 5.0 to 6.7 per cent. 
Subsequently, heightened flexibility thanks to regulatory change in the labour market led to 
a reduction in the unemployment rate to 13.4 per cent in the South and 6.4 per cent in the 
North. 
The Italian South, still today, is the largest backward region within the EU-15. This is 
no surprise, given that like the rest of the country the South has had great difficulty keeping 
pace with the other EU member states. Over the last twenty years, therefore, the South has 
fallen further behind. Whereas in 1995 its per capita output was 79 per cent of that of the 
EU-27, in 2008 it was just 70 per cent. Setting this performance alongside those of the other 
underdeveloped areas, it is clear that the Italian South has been excluded from processes of 
convergence that have involved not only the new member states in Eastern Europe but also 
the cohesion countries of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. However, while international 
convergence has been striking, regional disparities within those countries have been stable or 
increasing, especially in Eastern Europe. 
If the comparison is broadened to the OECD area, the picture remains negative. In 
2005 regional income inequality was highly variable. On average, interregional disparities 
were inversely proportion to the national level of development (Table 14). Of 27 OECD 
 
48countries, Italy ranked sixteenth in GDP and seventh in inequality, with a degree of 
inequality two-thirds higher than the median and nearly twice as high as in many countries 
of comparable per capita GDP, such as Spain, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, in many of the countries – but not Italy – the overall degree of inequality was 
significantly affected by the presence of one region with exceptionally high income, 
generally that of the national capital. Net of these regions, Italy moves up to rank third in 
inequality, behind only Mexico and Turkey. 
Italy’s greater income inequality by international standards appears to depend entirely 
on the exceptionally broad interregional differences in employment rates (Figure 20). This is 
an especially negative feature of Italian economic dualism. That is, compared with other 
countries economic inequalities in Italy weigh most heavily on an essential aspect of living 
conditions in the backward regions, namely the chances of being employed. 
5.2  The regional policy illusion and the disparity in national policy efficacy 
Historically, as we have seen, government action has been fundamental, for better or 
worse, in determining the size of the economic and social disparity between the South and 
the North of Italy. Regional development programmes (also known as “place-based 
policies”) have been directed explicitly to the economic and social development of the 
backward areas. But there has also been a powerful territorial effect from general policy, i.e. 
central government programmes for the entire country but whose effects differ from region 
to region. 
The nationwide extension of a series of programmes (schooling, but also health 
programmes such as compulsory vaccination, free medicines, the building of infrastructure) 
enabled the South to share in national development. This development was in part inclusive: 
a number of public programmes ensured that income differences were no longer 
accompanied by unsustainable social disparities. Thus the fact that since the 1970s the 
income and output gap has remained virtually unchanged does not mean the South has not 
made progress. Actually, the southern Italian regions have managed to keep pace with one of 
the most advanced areas of Europe. The totally obvious conclusion is that living conditions 
in the South today are better than thirty years ago. 
But things are less obvious if differences in “well-being” are measured by the more 
sophisticated indicators now available. In 150 years there has been significant if not total 
convergence in the improved human development index (Figure 4). But this is valid only if 
we measure the components by the same gauge in 1861 and in 2011. But if we look more 
closely at the present, observing students’ educational attainment rather than just the 
illiteracy rate, life expectancy without disability rather than infant mortality, felonies that 
indicate organized crime rather than total crimes, new and alarming dimensions of the 
disparity emerge (Figure 20). 
This is the reason for the renewed recognition, today, of the importance of general 
policy measures, indispensable to ensure a future of growth and development in the South, in 
particular through supplying higher-quality public services.
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69 This is reflected in regional policy measures and results. Given unequal conditions in North and South, the 
same economic policy measure will have different effects in the two areas. In a different context, even equally 
efficient administrators (while in reality those in the South, on average, are less efficient) will obtain different 
 
49The importance of national with respect to regional policy is given by their relative 
financial size. Total general government primary expenditure in the South – current and 
capital – averaged €200 billion a year from 2004 through 2006. In the Centre and North it 
came to over €400 billion. Per capita, the figures were €9,800 and €10,800 respectively. The 
difference depends mainly on current spending, in particular pension transfers. Capital 
expenditure, which is explicitly targeted to sustain long-term growth, counts for only a tenth 
of total spending. In 2004-06 average annual capital expenditure in the South was €21 billion 
(6 per cent of the area’s GDP), compared with €35 billion in the Centre and North (3.1 per 
cent of GDP). On a per capita basis capital spending in the South was about 10 per cent 
higher than in the rest of Italy. But if we also count investment by state-owned corporations, 
such as the State Railways, the difference vanishes (Viesti, 2009). 
There are a good many sectors in which the effects of national policy programmes are 
geographically uneven, including, crucially, education, justice, and law enforcement. There 
is no need to cite an abundant literature to observe that students’ educational attainment, the 
efficiency of the courts and the justice system, the ability of the administration to assure 
compliance with the law, or the degree of citizens’ confidence in public institutions are 
essential factors for the growth of an economy. What we observe is that in the South these 
factors, the primary object of national public action, are all at lower levels than in other 
regions; and this helps explain the area’s lower economic growth. 
In recent years, at the initiative of the Bank of Italy a number of studies have collected 
and set in order data on geographical disparities in the quantity and quality of public services 
in essential fields (Banca d’Italia, 2010). The data make it clear that the is a gap, in some 
cases a very wide one, between South and North. The difference has historical roots, but it 
also depends on present-day administrative capabilities at central and local level. The 
inequality cannot be blamed solely on the amount of resources allocated but depends also on 
how efficiently they are used and on the characteristics of the local environment. Overall, we 
find two important aspects. First, the significant disparity in the supply of many public 
services inevitably affects competitiveness and growth differentials; and second, the future 
development of the South of Italy necessarily depends to a great extent on national policy 
programmes, as defined here, designed to enhance the supply of those services. 
For some policy areas the need is to spend more and probably better in the South. For 
others, the priority is to recover efficiency. This does not mean either excusing the faults of 
regional development policy or limiting its role. Regional development policy is not useless 
but it can and must be improved, learning the lessons of experience.
70 The question is what 
role policies can play for southern growth and development. The answer is that all policies, 
regional but above all national, have to contribute. 
                                                        
results. If young people come from uneducated family backgrounds and move in social circles where crime is 
common, they are unlikely to achieve the same educational results as young people from cultured families that 
uphold civic values, even if the quality of teachers and school facilities were the same in both areas.  
70 For instance, reducing untargeted subsidies, which distort resource allocation and are only modestly 
effective; this would free resources for action on the social and economic framework. Or reducing overlapping 
competences among the various levels of government by applying, where possible, the principle of subsidiarity, 
as by restricting the veto power of local authorities (not only in the South) in respect of programmes in the 
national interest. 
 
50The desired result simply cannot be attained unless the South is placed at the centre of 
economic policy in general, not only explicit policy action to overcome geographical 
inequalities in development. The fact is that it will be impossible to provide the same quality 
of essential services in all parts of the country and to restart the process of convergence 
unless the Southern question becomes, once again, a national political question (Cannari, 
Magnani and Pellegrini, 2010). In the words of the President of the Republic, Giorgio 
Napolitano, “We cannot afford the luxury of leaving to fester what remains the gravest 
unresolved problem in our national unification process.”
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Regional disparities in Italy: an international comparison 
 
Structural data to 1871  Regional inequality in GDP per capita  
(mean log deviation population-weighted) 
1871 (*)  1911 (**)  1931-38 
(***)  1951 (***)  2005 
(7) 








gap between the 
“capital “ region and the 
two richest regions (a) 
Italy=1 1871=1 Italy=1 Italy=1  1911=1 Italy=1 
Habsburg Empire (1)  35,9  37,2  24 5,76  1,38  2,50  0,90  … …  …  … 
di cui: Austria  6,3  59,4 8  1,86 1,38 0,48  0,53  …  0,12 0,95 0,54 
Spain (2)  16,3  39,0  17  1,04  1,46 1,33  2,63  0,95  0,39 1,08 0,51 
Italy (3)  28,1  45,2  16  1,00  1,17 1,00  2,06  1,00  1,00 3,69 1,00 
Germany (4)  39,5  54,5  14  … …  0,34  …  0,0002  …  …  0,51 
France (5)  37,7  57,0  16  1,16 1,51  …  …  …  0,25  …  0,73 
United Kingdom (6)  31,7  100  11  0,51  1,34 0,50  2,02  …  0,05 0,41 0,54 
                      
 
 
Source: (1) Schultze (2007); (2) Martìnez-Gallaraga (2006), (3) Brunetti-Felice-Vecchi (2011); (4) e (5) 
Williamson (1964),  
(6) Crafts (2004): Data exclude Ireland.  
(7) Iuzzolino (2009): the number of regions considered is slightly different than in previous years. 
(a) GDP per capita in the region where the capital is located in relation to the average of the two richest regions   
(except the “capital” one). 
(*)  The years of comparison are different: Spain: 1860; Habsburg Empire: 1870; France: 1864. 
(**)The years of comparison are different: Spain: 1914; Habsburg Empire: 1910; Germany: 1900. 
(***)The years of comparison are different: Spain: 1930 compared with  Italy  1931; Germany: 1936 compared 
with  Italy 1936. 
(****)The years of comparison are different: Spain: 1955; Austria: 1957 (source: Williamson, 1964); France e 




Population Census by Regions in 1881 
(percentage composition on total labour force) 
 
Regions  Agricolture Industry Construction Commerce Transport Credit Insurance Personal Services 
Pubblic 
 Administration 
North West  59,5  20,2  3,7  6,4  2,1  0,2  6,2  1,7 
 Piemonte   65,7  16,4  3,2  5,6  1,5  0,1  5,8  1,7 
 Liguria   52,1  17,7  4,4  8,4  5,7  0,2  8,9  2,5 
 Lombardia   56,0  24,0  3,8  6,7  1,7  0,2  6,0  1,6 
North East  63,8  15,1  3,7  6,0  2,1  0,1  7,3  1,8 
Trentino Alto Adige  69,4  12,0  3,6  5,0  1,4  0,0  6,5  2,0 
 Veneto   63,5  16,0  2,4  6,8  2,3  0,1  7,0  1,8 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  59,3  17,4  4,8  6,0  2,4  0,2  8,0  1,9 
Emilia - Romagna  64,1  14,3  4,5  5,5  2,0  0,1  7,6  1,9 
Center 63,4  15,4  3,9  5,2  2,5  0,2  7,5  2,1 
 Marche   69,8  13,1  3,7  3,6  1,6  0,1  6,5  1,7 
 Toscana   58,9  19,1  4,1  6,2  2,9  0,2  7,0  1,8 
 Umbria   74,7  9,7  3,2  2,6  1,2  0,1  6,9  1,6 
 Lazio   61,3  13,2  4,0  6,0  3,0  0,2  9,2  3,1 
Center-North 61,8  17,4  3,7  6,0  2,2 0,2  6,9  1,9 
South and Islands  61,0  14,5  4,6  5,7  3,1  0,1  7,5  3,5 
 Campania   53,7  17,3  5,0  8,5  3,8  0,3  8,8  2,5 
 Abruzzi   76,3  9,8  4,3  2,6  0,9  0,0  4,7  1,4 
 Puglie   65,0  13,1  4,2  5,3  3,7  0,1  6,8  1,9 
 Basilicata   76,7  10,0  2,2  2,7  1,7  0,0  5,5  1,2 
 Calabria   58,4  11,2  4,4  3,1  2,8  0,0  6,0  14,0 
 Sicilia   56,1  17,9  4,5  6,8  3,8  0,2  8,6  2,2 
 Sardegna   61,5  12,5  6,6  4,5  2,6  0,1  10,2  2,1 
ITALY 61,6  16,4  4,0  5,9  2,5  0,1  7,1  2,4 
 








Manufacturing value added per capita  Manufacturing value added per capita 
Regions 
In relation to the total 
present population  
In relation to the present 
male population with at 




In relation to the total 
present population  
In relation to the present 
male population with at 
least 15 years 
Manufacturing 
value added in 
GDP 
North West  1,24  1,24 1,12  1,56  1,51  1,27 
  - Piemonte  1,07  1,08   1,04  1,33  1,28   1,15 
  - Lombardia  1,43  1,41   1,29 1,70  1,69    1,42 
  - Liguria  1,05  1,07   0,76 1,61  1,46    1,05 
North East  0,98  0,97   0,99 0,89  0,93   0,93 
  - Veneto  1,01  1,01   1,00  0,86  0,94   0,99 
  - Emilia Romagna  0,94  0,92   0,99  0,95  0,91   0,87 
Center 0,98  0,94 0,91  0,93  0,90   0,88 
  - Toscana  1,04  1,01  0,99 1,10  1,05    1,13 
  - Umbria  0,74  0,71  0,75 0,72  0,69    0,78 
  - Marche  0,91  0,93  1,11 0,72  0,75    0,88 
  - Lazio  1,05  0,93 0,72  0,87  0,81  0,58 
Center-North 1,09  1,08 1,03  1,20  1,18  1,09 
South and Islands  0,85  0,87 0,95  0,68  0,70  0,81 
  - Abruzzi  0,62  0,65 0,78  0,47  0,52  0,69 
  - Puglia  0,82  0,85 0,92  0,67  0,68  0,79 
  - Campania  1,05  1,04 0,98  0,96  0,98  1,02 
  - Basilicata  0,70  0,72 1,04  0,47  0,51  0,63 
  - Calabria  0,68  0,71 0,98  0,54  0,61  0,77 
  - Sicilia  0,96  1,00 1,02  0,65  0,63  0,76 
  - Sardegna  0,54  0,53 0,69  0,54  0,52  0,59 
Italy 1,00  1,00  1,00 1,00  1,00  1,00 
 
Source: Manufacturing value added: Ciccarelli-Fenoaltea (2009); Population, Istat (1965); GDP. Vecchi (2011). 
All data is to boundaries of the time. The added value is at 1911 prices: to express it in relation to GDP has been 




Sectoral composition of manufacturing value added 
(percentages) 
 
Incidence in the geographic area (1871) 
Main manufacturing sectors  Groups of manufacturing sectors 
classified by performance 1871-1911 (1) 
Regions 




North West  34,2  16,2  8,4 13,8  24,8  31,3  43,9  48,7 
  - Piemonte  35,7  16,6  9,3 9,4  25,5  27,5 47,0  53,0 
  - Lombardia  33,9  15,1  7,8 17,6  23,0  34,6  42,4  46,8 
  - Liguria  30,6  21,3  9,3 8,5  32,8  25,8  41,4  55,8 
North East  33,2  17,6  9,8 8,6  26,8  27,9  45,4  27,6 
  - Veneto  34,1  18,9  8,5 6,5  30,0  25,7  44,3  35,0 
  - Emilia Romagna  32,0  15,8 11,6  11,4  22,4  30,8 46,8  34,4 
Center 30,9  17,5  11,0  7,8 28,2  27,9  43,9  39,7 
  - Toscana  30,2  16,0  9,6 7,0  28,7  30,0  41,4  36,9 
  - Umbria  33,3  21,4  14,0 6,8  29,0  23,8  47,3  57,0 
  - Marche  25,0  18,8  12,6 14,7  25,3  33,2  41,5  36,9 
  - Lazio  37,1  18,3  11,7 3,8  29,3  19,7  51,0  49,9 
Center-North  33,1 16,9  9,4  11,0  26,1 29,6  44,3  41,0 
South and Islands  35,3  17,9  13,1 9,2  24,8  25,5 49,7  26,4 
  - Abruzzi  31,8  20,8  13,9 10,8  25,9  28,4  45,7  33,4 
  - Puglia  41,9  16,9  13,2 5,7  23,4  21,3  55,3  32,2 
  - Campania  31,5  15,2  11,1 14,4  24,4  32,2  43,4  31,5 
  - Basilicata  35,8  22,1  15,3 6,3  25,8  23,1 51,1  26,9 
  - Calabria  37,6  19,7  15,3 4,4  23,6  23,5 52,9  30,8 
  - Sicilia  36,6  18,0  14,0 7,3  24,9  20,9  54,1  29,1 
  - Sardegna  37,1  26,9  14,1 2,4  31,0  17,8  51,2  23,1 
Italy 33,8  17,2  10,6  10,4 25,7  28,2  46,1  33,6 
                  
Source: own elaborations on Ciccareli-Fenoaltea (2009) 
(1) The growth sectors (metallurgy, mechanical engineering, petrochemical, non-metallic minerals) in the 
period in question are those that have increased their impact on the national total of at least 2 percentage points, 
those in decline (food, tobacco, leather and footwear) are those that in the same period have reduced the 
incidence of at least 2 points. The remaining sectors are considered "stable". 





Highly industrialized Italian Provinces (1) 
    (unit values and percentage composition) 
 
Specialized in total manufacturing 
sectors  Specialized in at least one sector  Specialized in the mechanical
Provinces Provinces  Regions 










Share of regional 
value added 





Share of regional 
value added of 
the mechanical 
(2) 
   1871 
North West  8  57,1  78,6 13  92,9  73,1  6  78,0 
  - Piemonte  2  50,0  66,4  3  75,0  64,7  2  71,0 
  - Lombardia  5  62,5  82,9 8  100,0  80,4  3  68,6 
  - Liguria  1  50,0  93,6  2  100,0  65,9  1  97,7 
North East  2  12,5  19,6 14  87,5  31,6  2  17,2 
  - Veneto  2  25,0  33,5  8  100,0  44,7  2  27,9 
  - Emilia Romagna  0  0,0 0,0 6  75,0  13,1  0  0,0 
Center 3  21,4  34,8  12 85,7  25,2  1  5,4 
  - Toscana  3  37,5  66,0 8  100,0  37,9  1  11,4 
  - Umbria  0  0,0  0,0 3  75,0  20,6  0  0,0 
  - Marche  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0 
  - Lazio  0  0,0  0,0  1  100,0  7,3  0  0,0 
Center-North 13  29,5  53,8 39  88,6  51,7  9  47,3 
South and Islands  2  8,0 25,2  16  64,0  32,7  1  17,2 
  - Abruzzi  0  0,0  0,0 2  50,0  4,1  0  0,0 
  - Puglia  0  0,0  0,0  3  100,0  21,2  0  0,0 
  - Campania  1  20,0  47,6 3  60,0  54,2  1  52,3 
  - Basilicata  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0 
  - Calabria  0  0,0  0,0  2  66,7  12,0  0  0,0 
  - Sicilia  1  14,3  34,2 6  85,7  37,5  0  0,0 
  - Sardegna  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0 
Italy 15  21,7  44,9  55 79,7  45,7  10  38,0 
   1911 
North West  7  50,0  82,1 13  92,9  81,1  5  81,4 
  - Piemonte  2  50,0  74,1  4  100,0  72,1  1  61,1 
  - Lombardia  4  50,0  83,4 7  87,5  84,2  3  85,3 
  - Liguria  1  50,0  94,7  2  100,0  89,2  1  97,9 
North East  3  18,8  30,9 15  93,8  43,0  3  36,9 
  - Veneto  2  25,0  34,2  7  87,5  38,6  2  40,0 
  - Emilia Romagna  1  12,5 26,8 8  100,0  48,5  1  33,1 
Center 3  21,4  38,4  11 78,6  37,7  1  6,9 
  - Toscana  3  37,5  68,9 7  87,5  51,6  1  13,4 
  - Umbria  0  0,0  0,0 2  50,0  16,8  0  0,0 
  - Marche  0  0,0  0,0  1  100,0  28,3  0  0,0 
  - Lazio  0  0,0  0,0  1  100,0  18,3  0  0,0 
Center-North  13 29,5  62,2  39 88,6 64,1  9  59,5 
South and Islands  1  4,0 21,1  13  52,0  38,2  1  30,7 
  - Abruzzi  0  0,0  0,0 0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0 
  - Puglia  0  0,0  0,0  3  100,0  43,5  0  0,0 
  - Campania  1  20,0  59,9 2  40,0  57,2  1  75,6 
  - Basilicata  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0  0,0  0  0,0 
  - Calabria  0  0,0  0,0  1  33,3  6,6  0  0,0 
  - Sicilia  0  0,0  0,0 6  85,7  40,9  0  0,0 
  - Sardegna  0  0,0  0,0  1  50,0  1,8  0  0,0 
Italy 14  20,3  51,8  52 75,4  57,5  10  52,7 
                 
Source: own elaborations on Ciccareli-Fenoaltea (2009). 
(1) Provinces where the share of national manufacturing value added is at least 10 per cent higher than the 
corresponding share of the adult male population. (2) Concentration of regional manufacturing value added in 




Administrative districts with high manufacturing specializations in 1871: 
 spatial and sectoral distribution  
 
Number of 
districts  Population  Share of regional employment in manufacturing sectors 








area  Food Textiles Clothing, 
leather 
Metalmaking, 
engineering  Other 
Total 
North West  18  28,6  3.471  48,3  36,4 55,8  24,3  45,9 41,4  41,3 
  - Piemonte  4  19,0  856  29,5 35,8 50,2  12,9  32,9 30,9  32,0 
  - Lombardia  12  34,3  2.166  62,7 42,5 62,0  36,6  43,4 51,2  49,1 
  - Liguria  2  28,6  450  54,2  0,0 0,0  0,0  78,5 10,0  28,2 
North East  9  9,2  830  17,5  10,2 2,1  14,3  14,3 10,1  10,7 
  - Veneto  7  9,2  353  13,4  17,9 3,1  0,8  22,8 3,5  8,6 
  - Emilia Romagna  2  9,1  477  22,6 0,0 0,0  27,1 0,0  18,3  13,4 
Center 8  23,5  1.753  40,2  41,6 0,0  23,8  14,0  20,1  22,2 
  - Toscana  5  31,3  1.114  54,3  50,7 0,0  41,3  0,0 33,3  30,7 
  - Umbria  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  - Marche  2  28,6  218  23,5  0,0 0,0  17,6  0,0 11,2  8,4 
  - Lazio  1  20,0  421  50,3  66,7 0,0  0,0  65,6 7,2  27,5 
Center-North 35  17,9  6.054  37,1 30,5 35,0  21,3  29,7 28,3  28,8 
South and Islands  11  12,4  2.468  23,7 21,6 19,7  22,5 17,8  22,7  21,8 
  - Abruzzi  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  - Puglia  1  10,0  286  20,1  0,0 0,0  0,0  0,0 0,6  0,4 
  - Campania  4  21,1  1.028  37,3 41,5 38,5  39,1  48,9 39,1  40,9 
  - Basilicata  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  - Calabria  2  18,2  250  20,7 0,0 0,0  26,1  0,0 23,3  16,8 
  - Sicilia  3  12,5  761  29,4  27,6 0,0  28,1  0,0 23,9  21,0 
  - Sardegna  1  11,1  143  22,4  0,0 0,0  1,2  0,0 1,1  0,7 
Italy 46  16,2  8.521  31,9  27,5 31,6  21,8  25,5  26,4 26,4 
                      





Administrative Districts with at least 100 thousand inhabitants in 1871 
 
Present population  
Area  a) with no industrial 
specialization 
b) with at least one industrial 
specialization  c) total  (b/c)*100 
North West  16  15  31  48,4 
North East  5  4  9  44,4 
Center 10 7  17  41,2 
South and Islands  37  11  48  22,9 
Italy 68  37  105  35,2 
Population weighted by the share of alphabets (1) 
Area  a) with no industrial 
specialization 
b) with at least one industrial 
specialization  c) total  (b/c)*100 
North West  20  15  35  42,9 
North East  6  4  10  40,0 
Center 10 7  17  41,2 
South and Islands  25  10  35  28,6 
Italy 61  36  97  37,1 
        
 
Source: own elaborations on population census 1871 (cf. Methodological Note). 
(1) The weighting gives a double weight to the inhabitants who were able to read. The resulting weighted 




Administrative districts with high manufacturing specializations in 1871: list and 
structural features 
 
Persistence of the district 
into the industrial 
agglomerations of the years 
indicated (2) 
Area  Regions   District  Number of specializations and main sector  Illiteracy rate  
(1) 
1911 1951  2001 
North West  Liguria  Genova  4 - Metalmaking, engineering  LOW    YES  YES  NO 
North West  Liguria  Savona  1 - Metalmaking, engineering  LOW    YES  NO  NO 
North West  Lombardia  Bergamo  1 – Furniture  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Brescia  1 - Metalmaking, engineering  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Como  1 – Textiles  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Cremona  2 – Food  LOW    YES  NO  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Gallarate  1 – Textiles  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Lecco  2 – Textiles  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Lodi  2 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Milano  7 - Clothing, leather  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Monza  2 – Textiles  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Mortara  1 – Food  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
North West  Lombardia  Pavia  2 - Clothing, leather  LOW    YES  YES  NO 
North West  Lombardia  Sermide  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM NO  NO  NO 
North West  Piemonte  Biella  2 – Textiles  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North West  Piemonte  Pallanza  2 – Furniture  LOW    YES  NO  YES 
North West  Piemonte  Torino  7 - Textiles  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North  West  Piemonte Vercelli 1  -  Food  LOW     YES  NO  NO 
North East  Emilia Romagna  Bologna  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
North East  Emilia Romagna  Ferrara  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  NO  NO  YES 
North East  Veneto  Ampezzo  2 - Textiles  LOW    NO  NO  YES 
North East  Veneto  Longarone  1- Metalmaking, engineering  LOW    NO  NO  YES 
North East  Veneto  Maniago  2 - Metalmaking, engineering  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
North East  Veneto  Moggio Udinese  2 - Textiles  LOW    NO  NO  NO 
North East  Veneto  Piove di Sacco  1 - Furniture  MEDIUM  NO  NO  YES 
North East  Veneto  Venezia  3-  Metalmaking, engineering  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
North East  Veneto  Verona  1 - Food  LOW    YES  YES  YES 
Center  Lazio  Roma  3-  Metalmaking, engineering  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
Center  Marche  Fermo  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  NO  NO  YES 
Center  Marche  Urbino  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  NO  NO  YES 
Center  Toscana  Firenze  3 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
Center  Toscana  Lcca  1 - Paper  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
Center  Toscana  Livorno  3 - Food  LOW    YES  YES  NO 
Center  Toscana  Pisa  2 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
Center  Toscana  S. Miniato  1 - Chemicals  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
 
60Table 8, cont. 
 
Area  Regions   District  Number of specializations and main sector  Illiteracy rate  
(1) 
Persistence of the district 
into the industrial 
agglomerations of the years 
indicated (2) 
South and Islands  Calabria  Catanzaro  1 - Clothing, leather  HIGH  NO  NO  NO 
South and Islands  Calabria  Palmi  1 - Clothing, leather  HIGH  NO  NO  NO 
South and Islands  Campania  Casoria  2 - Textiles  MEDIUM  NO  NO  YES 
South and Islands  Campania  Napoli  4 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  YES  NO  NO 
South and Islands  Campania  Salerno  1 - Textiles  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
South and Islands  Campania  Vallo di Lucania  3 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  NO  NO  NO 
South and Islands  Puglia  Bari  1 - Chemicals  MEDIUM  YES  YES  YES 
South and Islands  Sardegna  Cagliari  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  NO  NO  YES 
South and Islands  Sicilia  Catania  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM  YES  YES  NO 
South and Islands  Sicilia  Messina  1 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM NO  NO  NO 
South and Islands  Sicilia  Palermo  4 - Clothing, leather  MEDIUM YES  NO  NO     
Source: own elaborations on Population census (1871) and Industrial census (1911, 1951 e 2001) (cf. 
Methodological Note).  
(1) LOW if the share of illiterate population is below the first quartile of the national distribution (calculated by 
size of population of districts); HIGH if the same proportion is higher than the third quartile. MEDIUM 
otherwise. (2) YES if the district has at least one municipality in the industrial agglomerations of the year 




Industrial agglomeration in 1911: distribution of manufacturing employment 
(percentages)     
Settore   Area  Highly specialized district in 
1871 
District  





Furniture  Paper Chemicals  Metalmaking, 
engineering 
Total 
Center NO  Ancona  -  -  -  -  4,6  5,7  -  0,3 
Center NO  Camerino  -  -  -  -  1,3  -  -  0,0 
Center NO  Frosinone  -  -  -  -  2,5  -  -  0,0 
Center NO  Pistoia  2,5  -  -  - -  -  1,1  0,5 
Center NO  Porto-Ferraio  -  -  -  - -  -  0,7  0,2 
Center NO  Sora  -  -  -  -  9,1  -  -  0,2 
Center NO  Terni  -  -  -  - -  6,2  2,4  0,9 
Center NO  Viterbo -  -  2,8  - -  -  -  0,2 
Center NO  Volterra  -  -  -  - -  -  1,4  0,4 
Center  Sub Total NO  2,5 -  2,8  -  17,6  11,9  5,6  2,7 
Center YES  Firenze  13,2  -  -  - -  -  -  1,3 
Center YES  Lucca  -  -  -  3,2  6,9  6,2  -  0,7 
Center YES  Livorno  1,2  -  -  - -  2,3  1,6  0,6 
Center YES  Pisa  -  -  -  2,8  -  -  -  0,2 
Center YES  Roma  -  -  8,6  -  6,4  -  -  0,7 
Center YES  S.  Miniato  2,3  -  -  - -  -  -  0,2 
Center  Sub Total YES  16,7 -  8,6  6,0 13,3  8,5  1,6  3,7 
Center Total     19,2  -  11,3  6,0  40,9  20,4  7,3  6,5 
North East  NO  Guastalla  1,0  -  -  1,5  -  -  -  0,2 
North East  NO  Modena  2,9  -  -  3,2  -  -  -  0,6 
North East  NO  Padova  -  -  -  2,1  -  -  -  0,2 
North East  NO  Parma  2,2  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
North East  NO  Piacenza  1,8  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
North East  NO  Reggio Emilia  2,2  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
North East  NO  Schio  0,9  1,7  -  -  -  -  -  0,8 
North East  NO  Treviso  -  -  -  2,0  -  -  -  0,2 
North East  NO  Udine  -  0,9  -  1,6  -  -  0,8  0,7 
North East  Sub Total NO  11,0 2,6  -  10,4  -  -  0,8  3,3 
North East  YES  Bologna  4,1  -  -  -  -  7,1  3,9  1,7 
North East  YES  Pordenone  -  1,4  -  -  -  -  -  0,6 
North East  YES  Venezia  -  -  -  2,6  -  4,4  2,7  1,1 
North East  YES  Verona  -  1,1  -  -  -  -  1,6  0,9 
North East  Sub Total YES  4,1 2,5  -  2,6  -  11,6  8,1  4,3 
North East Total     15,2  5,1  -  13,0  -  11,6  9,0  7,6 
North West     Abbiategrasso  1,4  3,0  -  -  -  -  -  1,5 
North West  NO  Alessandria  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,4  0,3 
North West  NO  Chiari  1,6  1,1  -  -  -  -  -  0,7 
North West  NO  Clusone  -  2,2  -  -  -  -  -  1,0 
North West  NO  Novara  2,6  3,1  -  -  2,5  -  -  1,7 
North West  NO  Novi Ligure  -  1,0  -  -  -  -  -  0,5 
North West  NO  Pinerolo  -  1,3  -  -  -  -  -  0,5 
North West  NO  Salò  -  -  -  -  2,3  -  -  0,0 
North West  NO  Spezia  -  -  -  -  -  -  4,3  1,1 
North West  NO  Susa  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,2  0,3 
North West  NO  Treviglio  -  2,6  -  -  -  -  -  1,2 
North West  NO  Varallo  -  0,8  -  -  -  -  -  0,3 
North West  NO  Varese  2,4  3,0  3,1  2,3  3,7  -  -  2,0 
North West  Sub Total NO  7,9 18,2  3,1  2,3  8,5 -  6,9  11,0 
North West  YES  Bergamo  2,8  6,4  -  -  3,9  -  -  3,2 
North West  YES  Biella  -  5,7  -  -  5,3  -  -  2,6 
North West  YES  Brescia  -  2,0  -  -  -  -  3,6  1,8 
North West  YES  Como  -  6,9  -  5,1  -  -  -  3,4 
North  West  YES  Cremona 2,1 1,6  -  -  - -  -  0,9 
North West  YES  Gallarate  -  11,3  -  3,3  2,8  -  3,3  6,1 
North West  YES  Genova  7,4  3,8  7,9  9,3  5,6  11,5  12,4  7,4 
North West  YES  Lecco  -  5,1  -  -  -  -  2,2  2,8 
North West  YES  Lodi  2,2  -  -  1,9  -  -  -  0,4 
North West  YES  Milano  12,3  10,2  15,4  14,3  28,9  22,9  20,8  14,7 
North West  YES  Monza  -  9,2  -  8,8  -  -  3,6  5,7 
North West  YES  Mortara  -  1,6  3,8  -  -  -  -  0,9 
North West  YES  Pallanza  -  1,6  -  -  3,4  -  1,0  1,0 
North West  YES  Pavia  2,1  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
North West  YES  Savona  -  -  -  -  -  -  2,6  0,7 
North West  YES  Torino  7,4  9,3  13,0  14,0  10,8  17,8  13,4  11,2 
North West  YES  Vercelli  1,9  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
North West  Sub Total YES  38,2 74,7  40,1  56,7  60,6  52,2  62,9  63,1 
North West Total     46,2  92,9  43,2  59,0  69,1  52,2  69,8  74,2 
South and Islands  NO  Acireale  -  -  -  -  -  2,9  -  0,1 
South and Islands  NO  Barletta  -  -  5,3  4,0  -  -  -  0,7 
South and Islands  NO  Brindisi  -  -  2,6  -  -  -  -  0,2 
South and Islands  NO  Caltagirone  -  -  2,1  -  -  -  -  0,1 
South and Islands  NO  Castellammare  4,3  -  -  3,5  -  -  1,7  1,1 
South and Islands  NO  Pozzuoli  0,9  -  -  -  -  -  1,4  0,5 
South and Islands  NO  Sassari  1,0  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,1 
South and Islands  NO  Taranto  -  -  2,9  -  -  -  1,6  0,6 
South and Islands  NO  Trapani  1,9  -  2,5  2,2  -  -  -  0,5 
South and Islands  Sub Total NO  8,1 -  15,4  9,7  -  2,9  4,8  4,1 
South and Islands  YES  Bari  2,7  -  6,3  5,2  -  -  -  1,1 
South and Islands  YES  Catania  -  -  3,9  -  -  4,0  -  0,4 
South and Islands  YES  Napoli  5,8  -  13,6  7,1  -  9,0  9,3  4,8 
South and Islands  YES  Palermo  -  -  6,2  -  -  -  -  0,4 
South and Islands  YES  Salerno  2,9  2,0  -  -  -  -  -  1,2 
South and Islands  Sub Total YES  11,4 2,0  30,0  12,3  -  13,1  9,3  7,8 
South and Islands Total     19,5  2,0  45,4  21,9  0,0  15,9  14,0  11,7 
Total     100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
(Number of employees)    95.865  422.417  59.822  81.269  18.204  43.552  244.060  965.190 








Macro Area  Industrial 
agglomeration in 1911 
Main Municipality 
 1951 
Food  Textiles, clothing, 
leather and footwear 
Wood, furniture and non-
metallic minerals  Paper  Chemicals Metalmaking Engineering 
Total  
Center  NO  Citta' di Castello  9,4  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,3 
Center NO  Perugia  11,0 -  -  -  -  -  -  0,3 
Center  Sub Total NO  20,3  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,6 
Center YES  Carrara  -  -  10,1  -  -  -  -  0,5 
Center YES  Cascina  -  -  4,6  -  -  -  -  0,2 
Center YES  Castelfidardo  -  -  -  -  3,2  -  -  0,3 
Center YES  Empoli  -  -  5,4  -  -  -  -  0,3 
Center YES  Firenze  -  -  -  7,7  -  -  3,2  1,9 
Center YES  Lucca  9,3  2,7  -  -  -  -  -  1,0 
Center YES  Pisa  -  -  9,6  -  -  -  -  0,5 
Center YES  Ponsacco  -  -  0,9  -  -  -  -  0,0 
Center YES  Pontedera  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,8  0,4 
Center YES  Prato  -  8,0  -  -  -  -  -  2,2 
Center YES  Roma  -  -  -  36,7  -  -  -  1,8 
Center YES  Sesto  Fiorentino  -  -  5,2  -  -  -  -  0,3 
Center  Sub Total YES  9,3  10,7  35,7  44,4  3,2  -  4,0  9,5 
Center Total     29,7 10,7  35,7  44,4  3,2  - 4,0  10,1 
North East  NO  Manzano  -  -  2,4  -  -  -  -  0,1 
North East  NO  Monfalcone  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,9  0,9 
North East  Sub Total NO  -  -  2,4  -  -  -  1,9  1,1 
North East  YES  Bologna  -  -  -  -  -  -  3,7  1,8 
North East  YES  Modena  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,5  0,7 
North East  YES  Padova  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,6  0,8 
North East  YES  Pordenone  -  1,9  -  -  -  -  -  0,5 
North East  YES  Valdagno  -  5,7  -  -  -  -  -  1,5 
North East  YES  Venezia  -  -  10,5  -  8,0  -  -  1,3 
North East  YES  Verona  - -  -  5,6 -  -  -  0,3 
North East  Sub Total YES  -  7,6  10,5  5,6  8,0  -  6,8  7,0 
North East Total     -  7,6  12,9  5,6  8,0  -  8,7  8,0 
North West  NO  Asti  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,8  0,4 
North West  NO  Casale Monferrato  -  -  5,5  -  -  -  -  0,3 
North West  NO  Ivrea  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,4  0,7 
North West  Sub Total NO  -  -  5,5  -  -  -  2,2  1,4 
North West  YES  Bergamo  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,5  0,7 
North West  YES  Biella  -  8,4  -  -  -  -  -  2,3 
North West  YES  Borgosesia  -  2,8  -  -  -  -  -  0,7 
North West  YES  Brescia  -  -  -  -  -  -  2,7  1,3 
North West  YES  Busto Arsizio  -  32,0  -  -  -  -  -  8,7 
North West  YES  Casalpusterlengo  -  -  3,2  -  -  -  -  0,2 
North West  YES  Chieri  -  1,1  -  -  -  -  -  0,3 
North West  YES  Como  -  4,0  -  -  -  -  -  1,1 
North West  YES  Desio  -  6,0  -  -  -  -  -  1,6 
North West  YES  Gardone Val Trompia  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,5  0,3 
North West  YES  Genova  -  -  -  -  -  -  9,2  4,4 
North West  YES  La Spezia  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,7  0,8 
North West  YES  Lecco  -  -  -  -  -  26,9  1,5  1,2 
North West  YES  Legnano  - -  -  -  -  -  3,1 1,5 
North West  YES  Lissone-Meda-Cantù  -  -  34,8  -  -  -  -  1,9 
North West  YES  Lumezzane  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,6  0,3 
North West  YES  Milano  -  -  -  50,0  67,3  -  35,1  25,8 
North West  YES  Monza  -  5,4  -  -  -  -  -  1,5 
North West  YES  Novara  -  5,0  -  -  -  -  -  1,4 
North West  YES  Pavia  -  -  -  -  -  -  1,9  0,9 
North West  YES  Sesto San Giovanni  -  -  -  -  -  73,1  -  1,4 
North West  YES  Torino  -  -  -  -  21,5  -  25,7  14,4 
North West  YES  Trivero  -  6,2  -  -  -  -  -  1,7 
North West  YES  Valenza  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,5  0,2 
North West  YES  Varese  -  2,2  -  -  -  -  1,1  1,1 
North West  YES  Verbania  -  2,3  -  -  -  -  -  0,6 
North West  YES  Vigevano  -  4,5  -  -  -  -  -  1,2 
North West  YES  Trivero-Valle Mosso  -  1,8  -  -  -  -  -  0,5 
North West  Sub Total YES  -  81,7  38,1  50,0  88,8  100,0  85,1  78,0 
North West Total     -  81,7  43,6  50,0  88,8  100,0  87,3  79,4 
South and Islands  NO  Battipaglia  17,8  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,5 
South and Islands  NO  Calangianus  - -  1,3 -  -  -  -  0,1 
South and Islands  NO  Lanciano  4,3 -  -  -  -  -  -  0,1 
South and Islands  NO  Lecce  10,2  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,3 
South and Islands  NO  San Giovanni In Fiore  -  -  1,3  -  -  -  -  0,1 
South and Islands  Sub Total NO  32,2  -  2,6  -  -  -  -  1,1 
South and Islands  YES  Bari  14,9  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,5 
South and Islands  YES  Catania  -  -  4,7  -  -  -  -  0,3 
South and Islands  YES  Marano di Napoli  -  -  0,6  -  -  -  -  0,0 
South and Islands  YES  Marsala  9,5  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,3 
South and Islands  YES  Nocera Inferiore  6,0  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
South and Islands  YES  Torre Annunziata  7,7  -  -  -  -  -  -  0,2 
South and Islands  Sub Total YES  38,1  -  5,3  -  -  -  -  1,4 
South and Islands Total     70,3  -  7,8  -  -  -  -  2,6 
Total     100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0  100,0 
(Number of employees)    29.344  264.126  52.711  46.711  93.276  17.982  466.494  970.644 
 Source: own elaborations on Industrial census 1911 and 1951. (cf. Methodological Note). 
 




Effect of migration on the North-South differential in GDP per capita 
 
Variation of the gap (percentage points) 
of which: Population effect 
Year 
GDP per capita gap 
(South/ Center North )*100  Total  of which: GDP effect  Total  of which: international 
migration effect 
of which: national migration 
effect 
1881 98,5           
1901 88,0  -10,6  -10,7  0,1 -2,0   
1911 81,4  -6,5  -10,0  3,5 0,1  
1921 73,6  -7,8  -12,4  4,6 2,0  
1931 64,5  -9,1  -6,6  -2,6  -0,7  
1951 47,3  -17,2  -13,7  -3,5  -0,1  
1961 55,8 8,5  7,5  1,1 0,0 4,1 
1971 67,0  11,2  6,5  4,8 0,0 7,0 
1981 62,2  -4,8  -3,5  -1,4 0,0 2,9 
1991 59,6  -2,5  -0,6  -1,9 0,0 1,6 
2001 58,0  -1,6  -2,0  0,4 0,0 2,5 
2009 61,6 3,6  0,1  3,6 0,0 2,0 
           
 









Number of employees in manufacturing plants located in Southern Italy in 1977 (1) 
 









industrial groups  Total 




Abruzzo 12.907 11.063 4.470 28.440 20.655 49.095
Molise 690 3.389 0 4.079 1.847  5.926
Basso Lazio  5.569 29.074 26.465 61.108 29.268 90.376
Campania 63.291 27.179 19.768 110.238 103.676 213.914
Puglia 31.727 18.072 3.682 53.481 46.716 100.197
Basilicata 3.980 3.310 0 7.290 5.067  12.357
Calabria 4.059 3.271 2.633 9.963 9.942 19.905
Sicilia 21.919 17.526 3.003 42.448 30.080 72.528
Sardegna 8.303 14.714 1.218 24.235 20.021 44.256
Total   152.445 127.598 61.239 341.282 267.272 608.554
     




Industrial agglomerations in geographical areas 
   
Number of agglomerations   Share of municipalities belonging to at least one 
industrial agglomeration 
Year  North 
West 
North 




Anno  North 
West 
North 




1951  35  10  16  11  1951  3,5 1,0 2,9 0,9 
1961  40  18  22  4 1961  3,5 2,1 5,9 0,4 
1971  42  23  20  8 1971  4,6 4,2 9,2 0,4 
1981 48  35  29  24 1981 8,1 11,9  16,4 2,2 
1991 46  40  41  31 1991  10,7  20,7  18,0 3,7 
2001 45  41  41  37 2001  11,5  24,0  18,9 4,5 
Distribution of manufacturing employment in the 
industrial agglomeration by area (Italy=100) 
Share of manufacturing employment located in 
industrial agglomeration (area=100) 
Year  North 
West 
North 




Anno  North 
West 
North 




1951  79,4 8,0 10,1 2,6 1951 41,7 12,7 20,5  4,5 
1961 74,8 11,8 12,3  1,1 1961 41,0 16,8 23,3  2,4 
1971 70,5 12,8 14,7  2,0 1971 38,8 15,5 23,8  3,9 
1981 50,8 18,0 22,2  9,0 1981 32,6 20,7 33,3 15,5 
1991 45,2 25,5 20,7  8,6 1991 32,1 27,1 32,1 13,9 
2001 37,1 30,6 21,1 11,2 2001 28,5 30,2 33,5 18,4 
Source: own elaborations on Industrial census 1951-2001 (cf. Methodological Note). 
 




Ranking of regional inequality in GDP per capita in 2005 
 
 
Theil indices (1)  Theil index Italy=100 
Countries 
Number of 
regions  Total 
regions 
net of the 
“capital” 
region 





net of the 
“capital” 
region 
net of the 
richest 
region 
Mexico 32  0,1435  0,0786  0,0786  400  208  219 
Slovak Republic  4  0,1037  0,0076  0,0076  289  20  21 
Hungary 7  0,0803  0,0163  0,0163  224  43  45 
Turkey 26  0,0758  0,0779  0,0673  211  206  188 
Czech Republic  8  0,0631  0,0017  0,0017  176  4  5 
Belgium 3  0,0503  0,0108  0,0108  140  29  30 
Italy  21  0,0358  0,0377  0,0359  100  100  100 
Greece 4  0,0353  0,0007  0,0007  98  2  2 
Poland 16  0,0321  0,0114  0,0114  90  30  32 
Portugal 7  0,0317  0,0061  0,0061  88  16  17 
France 22  0,0302  0,0027  0,0027  84  7  8 
Norway 7  0,0287  0,0044  0,0044  80  12  12 
United Kingdom  12  0,0224  0,0044  0,0044  63  12  12 
Austria 9  0,0216  0,0071  0,0071  60  19  20 
Canada 12  0,0208  0,0338  0,0204  58  90  57 
Sweden 8  0,0205  0,0012  0,0012  57  3  3 
Spain 19  0,0196  0,0159  0,0159  55  42  44 
Germany 16  0,0195  0,0198  0,0151  54  52  42 
Ireland 2  0,0147  ..  ..  41  ..  .. 
Denmark 3  0,0134  0,0186  0,0027  38  49  7 
Finland 5  0,0124  0,0030  0,0124  35  8  35 
United States  51  0,0119  0,0085  0,0085  33  22  24 
Japan 10  0,0077  0,0060  0,0078  21  16  22 
Netherlands 4  0,0054  0,0066  0,0022  15  18  6 
Australia 8  0,0052  0,0047  0,0049  15  12  14 
New Zealand  2  0,0020  ..  ..  6  ..  .. 
Korea 7  0,0015  0,0026  0,0010  4  7  3 
 
 
Source: own elaborations on OCSE. 
 “…”: Not significant because the number of regions considered is less than 3. 
 (1) The ranking does not change significantly using alternative indicators of inequality (cf. Iuzzolino, 2009, tab. 1). 
 
66Figure 1   
GDP per capita gaps between macro-regions 











1871 1891 1911 1931 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2009
Center North - South
East -West
"Capital" regions - Other regions
North West - Other regions
 
Source: own elaborations on Brunetti-Felice-Vecchi, 2011. The West includes the north-western regions, 
Toscana, Lazio, Campania, Calabria and the Islands (the East includes all other regions). The regions 'capital' 




Disparities in population, GDP and GDP per capita between Center North and 
Southern Italy 




















































































































































































































Disparities in per capita GDP Disparities in population )Disparities in GDP (at constant prices
 
 





































Source: Mezzogiorno e Center-North: Brunetti-Felice-Vecchi, 2011; Countries: Maddison: 


















1871 1891 1911 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Improved Human Development Index (1)
GDP per capita (2)
GDP per capita (3)
 
Source: (1) Felice, 2007: the indicator summarizes the level of income, education and life 




GDP per capita of the Italian regions: 1891-2009 



































































































































































































Abruzzi Campania Basilicata Puglia Calabria Sicilia Sardegna
 
Source: Daniele-Malanima (2007). Piemonte includes Valle’Aosta, Veneto includes il Trentino Alto 




Crimes reported per 100.000 inhabitants (murders, robberies, extortion, usurpation and damages) 


































































Manufacturing value added 
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Administrative districts with high manufacturing specializations in 1871: population 








Noth West North East Center South and Islands
Specialized districts in 1871 not counted among the industrial agglomerations of
1911 (a)




Source: own elaborations on Population census (1871) and Industrial census (1911) 














Growth in labor productivity in manufacturing  (1)
Variation in the GDP per capita gap North-South (2)
Variation in the GDP per capita gap North-South (3)
 
Source: (1) output per FTE worker percentage changes; yearly average in periods: 
Broadberry-Giordano-Zollino (2011). (2) Daniele-Malanima, 2007. (3) Brunetti-Felice-





Per capita GDP growth and North-Sud disparities 














1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-01 1901-11 1911-21 1921-31 1931-41 1941-51 1951-61 1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1991-01 2001-09
Yearly % changes in disparities (Mezzogiorno as % of Center North)  Per capita GDP growth in Italy (Yearly % changes)
   
Source: own elaborations on Daniele-Malanima (2007) and Svimez (2011). 
 
 
Figure 11   
Per capita GDP variability in Northen and Southern regions: 
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Source: value added is taken from the publications mentioned; population is taken from the 





Manufacturing employment located in industrial agglomerations 

















Source: own elaborations on Population census (1871) and Industrial census in the years indicated. The data of 1871 and 
1911 are calculated on the basis of information not consistent with each other and different from those of subsequent years 





















































































































































































































































Source: period 1954-1992: Casavola (1994). Period 1993-2003: Istat estimates. From 2004: Istat, Rilevazione 




Provincial distribution of GDP per capita at current prices (in relation to the Italian 
average) 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 (1) 
 
 
Source: own elaborations on Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne and Svimez data. (1) Data refer to 95 




Provincial distribution of GDP per capita at current prices (in relation to the Italian 
average) for the years 1981,1991,2001,2007 (1)  
 
 
Source: own elaborations on Istituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne and Svimez data. (1) Data refer to 95 
provinces in 1951. 
 
75Figure 17 
Productivity (2000 prices), Units of  labour (ULA), wages, Unit labour cost 










Productivity (2000 prices), Units of  labour (ULA), wages, Unit labour cost 














































































































































































Investment in the South as a percentage of 
Center North
Investment in the South as a percentage of GDP
Investment in the Center North as a percentage 
of GDP
   





Regional disparities in income, productivity and employment in OECD countries (1) 



































Source: own elaborations on OCSE data. (1) Distance between the economically backward 
regions and the rest of the country. The "backward" regions are those with GDP per capita 

















Life expectancy at birth
(1861)
Life expectancy free of
disability at 15
years(2005)
Literacy (1861) Skills of students: high in
mathematics (2009)






Source: own elaborations on Vecchi, 2011 and SVIMEZ, 2011 (for 1861 and 1891 data, 
respectively) and Istat (for recent years). Life expectancy is measured in years; literacy and 
skills of students as a percentage of the population aged 15-19 years, in the first case, and 15 
years in the second. Total crimes from 1891 is related to one thousand inhabitants. Crimes 
linked to the Mafia in 2008 are expressed in relation to 100 000 inhabitants and is composed of 






An operational definition of industrial agglomeration 
Description of the algorithm 
Writing z
ip for the number of employees in the i
th region and in the p
th industry and Z
p 
for the employment in the whole country in the same industry, a frequently used index of 
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In the random location choice model proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) the 
expected value of the G index becomes: 
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where H is the Herfindahl index of the distribution of the industry plant size and ￿is a 
parameter positively correlated to the intensity of agglomerating forces in the industry. If 
such forces are negligible (￿=0), we have:  
0 ) 1 ( ); , (
~ 2 2 0      
 H x G i   
  
We can therefore verify that the G index is not a correct measure of agglomeration 
because a spatial random distribution of a few plants may lead to a high value of G (through 
the H effect) even if agglomeration forces are not in action. Therefore G can be viewed as a 
“raw concentration” index that must be corrected for the share of concentration that would 
be expected to arise randomly. 
In Iuzzolino (2004) we propose an algorithm to find industrial agglomerations based 
on this intuition of Ellison and Glaeser. As a first step, where no agglomeration advantages 
exist, we can split the random variable G into mutually independent “local components” 
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In such a way we build an analytical link between the geographical concentration of an 
industry and the industrial specialization of a region. Gi can be viewed indeed as being both 
the contribution of the i
th region to the “raw concentration” in the industry and the degree of 
“raw specialization” of this region in that industry.  
 
79If available census data allow us to estimate for each area (down to the level of the 
municipality) both Gi and mean and variance parameters, we can test if the level of raw 
specialization of a local area is statistically consistent with the presence of agglomeration 
economies. 
In particular, the basic step of the algorithm we propose is the selection of the areas 
where the difference between raw specialization (Gi) and the sample mean, under the null of 
￿i=0, is larger than ￿time its standard deviation: 
 (1)  i i i G    *   . 
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It is interesting to note that, raw specialization being equal (that is holding fixed the 
value of si and xi,), the difference between the two sides of inequality (1) depends on the hi 
and therefore on the number and on the relative dimension of the firms located in the area. 
Sorting the areas by descending levels of  this difference, we expect then to find at the top of 
the list those areas whose specialization is due to the presence of a great number of 
homogeneous firms: a condition that fits well with the intuitive notion of agglomeration. 
In censuses prior to 1981, there is no information on the distributions of employees by 
size of plants (necessary for the calculation of H), broken down by industry and 
municipality. As shown in Iuzzolino-Menon (2010) in the absence of this information you 
can use the average size of firm (number of employees/number of firms), correspondingly 
increasing the threshold of significance ￿ 
With (1) we can select the single municipality with a strong industrial specialization 
that can be ascribed to agglomeration advantages. The next question we have to answer is 
the building up, around those municipalities, of an agglomerated area (AA) that could 
approach the space of probable diffusion of such advantages.  
In this regard we think that the cross-border spillover mechanism from a “point of 
agglomeration” tends to determine relatively high levels of specialization (at least in the 
sense of ￿i>0 i i G   ) also in the neighbouring areas. Denoting with d(i,j) a dichotomic 
variable that holds zero only if the i
th and j
th areas are neighbouring, an AA can be depicted 
by: 








In this way, an AA expands until no-specialized areas border each one of its i
th 
components. Such a property, which we impose on our algorithm, can be interpreted as an 
example of the process of spatial correlation that is peculiar to several economic phenomena: 
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80in fact, an area with a large value of Gi (beyond the “1” threshold) may represent a “centre of 
agglomeration” so that firms will locate their plants in the neighbourhood. Therefore, the 
likelihood of finding other specialized area around the “centre” will be high. Moreover, if we 
suppose that the intensity of agglomeration advantages falls off with distance, this likelihood 
will decrease as we move away from the “centre”. The presence of non-specialized areas that 
enclose the AA may then announce the exhaustion of localization advantages. 
After we have built the “more agglomerated area”, starting from the municipality with 
the maximum value of Gi fulfilling the condition (1), we look for other possible 
agglomerations, repeating the process up to a complete exploration of the country.  
In conclusion, from (1) and (2) we can define as AA a continuum of municipalities, all 
specialized in a predetermined industry, at least one of which exceeds the degree of 
specialization calculated under the null hypothesis of absence of agglomeration advantages. 
Problems arising from incomplete census information 
Intertemporal comparisons reported in the text should be interpreted with caution: only 
the census data from 1951 to 2001 have the same observation field, both sectoral and 
territorial. That of of 1871 and 1911 are calculated on the basis of information not consistent 
with each other and different from those of subsequent years. In particular, the following 
issues should be mentioned: 
1. In the population census of 1871 the total employment local data (necessary for the 
calculation of xi) are not very reliable: the proportion of unoccupied population (reported in 
the census category number 17 "people charged to others or without profession") is actually 
extremely variable even within the same region (between the districts of the Veneto, for 
example, it varies between 33 and 98 percent). For this reason we chose the population size, 
instead of employment, as a parameter for comparison. 
2. The data of 1871 are not available at the municipality level, but that of the district 
administration. This tends to oversize the extension of specialized areas. To reduce the 
impact of this problem, the significance threshold was was set equal to twice that used for 
industrial census of the following years. 
3. For the construction of the test, data from the population census of 1871 have been 
adjusted and integrated to address the numerous problems of missing information: 
- identification of population employed in manufacturing sectors: we have selected the 
classes and subclasses of economic activity using the procedures in Fenoaltea (2001). This 
procedure was implemented at the provincial level (in the absence of sufficiently 
disaggregated data for the district). Subsequently, each crossing district/sector is assigned the 
same coefficient of the province. We considered all employed males reported in the Census 
of the population. The employed women were instead calculated on the basis of female/male 
employment ratio reported for each sector in Ellena, V. (1879); 
- estimate of the average size of firms: for the industries surveyed by Ellena, V. (1879) 
we used the regional data, attributing them to each district in the region. For sectors not 
surveyed in Ellena, V. (1879), we used the parameters of the census of 1911, assuming that 
variations in these parameters between 1871 and 1911 were similar to the average of other 
(surveyed) sectors. 
 
814. According to Fenoaltea (2007) census data of 1911 severely underestimate the size 
of the handicrafts; the underestimation would also be geographically uneven, especially for 
Southern regions where the craft industry was relatively more important. In the analysis 
reported in the text, it means that the agglomerations of 1911 are particularly representative 
of the most modern and structured Italian industry. For this reason, comparisons with 1871  
are useful primarily in the sense of "birth" (how many districts specialized become "strong" 
industrial agglomerations). Instead, the comparisons with 1951 are especially useful in the 
sense of "mortality" (how many "strong" industrial agglomerations do not survive to the 
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